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INTERVENING IN MARKETS ON THE BASIS
OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ALAN SCHWARTZ t AND Louis L. WILD
INTRODUCTION

A common justification for recent judicial and legislative interventions in consumer markets to set contract terms or to require
firms to disclose price or other product-related information is that
consumers are imperfectly informed with respect to the transactions
they make.' It is generally recognized, however, that information
is never perfect; the decisionmaker's task, therefore, is to characterize, in terms of the need for intervention, real world states that
are intermediate between perfect information and perfect ignorance.
These decisions are now made in what can be described politely as
an impressionistic fashion, because lawyers have no rigorous tools
for evaluating and responding to information problems. In recent
years, economists have developed a variety of models that begin to
explain the behavior of markets characterized by imperfect information.2 These models, however, have been of little practical
use to most lawyers, judges, and legislators, because of their mathematical complexity. The goal of this Article is to communicate to
f Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. B.S. 1961,
Bates College; LL.B. 1964, Yale University.
ff Associate Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology. B.A.
1972, University of Iowa; M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, University of Rochester.
An earlier version of this paper was presented to a faculty workshop at the
University of Southern California Law Center. The authors also very much
appreciate the numerous useful suggestions made by Michael J.Graetz, Michael E.
Levine, Julius G. Getman, Melvin A. Eisenberg, Robert E. Scott, Stephen J.Morse,
and Burton H. Klein.
I Recent statutes that attempt to eliminate the causes or respond to the effects
of imperfect information include: the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1976); the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976); the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691f (1976) (including both the Truth in
Lending Act, id. §§ 1601-1665a, and the Consumer Leasing Act, id. §§ 1667-1667e);
the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976); and the UNIFOWM
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE.

The doctrine of strict liability in tort also is justified partly on the ground that
consumers lack the information to evaluate the risks of product-caused injuries. See,
e.g., G. CA.,uAEsi, TrE CosTs OF AccnmFrrs 163-64 (1970); Calabresi & H-irschoff,
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1062 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Butters, Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices,
44 REv. EcoN. Svu.. 465 (1977); Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition,
66 Am. EcoN. REv. PApmEs & Proc. 240 (1976). See also authorities cited in notes
16 & 28 infra.
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lawyers and decisionmakers the legal implications of this new "economics of information." 3
The first section of this Article demonstrates that the normative objections to enforcing contracts made by imperfectly informed
consumers are generally unjustified when those contracts concern
goods exchanged in competitive markets. A decision to intervene,
either to regulate contract terms or to require information disclosure, therefore cannot be sustained by a showing that an appreciable number of consumers are uninformed; rather, the normative question should be whether the existence of imperfect information has produced noncompetitive prices and terms. Because a
decisionmaker cannot resolve this issue without an understanding
of how markets characterized by imperfect information behave, the
behavior of such markets is described below in part II.
The third section of this Article illustrates the ways in which
economic theory can assist a decisionmaker in deciding whether the
existence of imperfect information has caused a market to behave
noncompetitively. Such an inquiry would be both expensive and
impossible to develop precisely, given the current state of the science of the economics of information. Nevertheless, the theory generates criteria that will enable decisionmakers to determine in an
acceptably rigorous fashion whether information problems are sufficiently serious to justify interventions in markets. The discussion
in part III concludes by setting forth these criteria.
Part IV relaxes two important assumptions upon which the
basic argument partially rests: (I) that the goods sold in any particular market are homogeneous, and (2) that firms sell to all
consumers under the same terms. The object of part IV is not to
discuss the congeries of legal and economic problems raised by
product heterogeneity and firm discrimination among consumers,
but to show that the analysis of parts I to III and the policy suggestions that follow generally continue to hold under more realistic
assumptions.
Finally, part V discusses several interesting normative issues
raised by interventions in markets on the basis of imperfect information; the section concludes with a summary of the argument's
3 Two prominent commentators have observed that the 1970's has been the
decade of the economics of information. Joskow & Noll, Regulation in Theory and
Practice:An Overview, in PuBic REcuIAmoN (G. Fromm ed., forthcoming 1979).
Professor Kornhauser recently made interesting reference to some of the earlier
models but did not attempt to set out a general framework for responding to information problems. See Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64
CALwF. L. REv. 1151, 1167-77 (1976).
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policy and institutional implications. With respect to these considerations, the economics of information teaches that some methods
of intervention are more likely to move markets toward competitive equilibria than others. The analysis also suggests that courts
legislatures, and administrative agencies have different capacities
for responding effectively to information problems. Part V thus
makes several substantive and institutional suggestions for reform
of the legal methods currently available to deal with those information problems that are deemed serious enough to require some
form of state response.
It must be stressed, however, that the analysis made here is preliminary in nature. The primary goals of this Article are to show
that information problems in consumer markets raise difficult but
familiar issues of how the state can best ascertain and remedy market imperfections, and to offer some assistance in resolving these issues. Much more work remains to be done before the competitive
state of markets can be characterized precisely and the most effective
remedies and remedial structures ascertained with assurance. But
the problems addressed in the following analysis have remained unanswered for too long. This Article should be viewed as an early
sign-post along the path to their resolution.
I.

THE RELEVANCE OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION TO

LEGAL INTERVENTION

A. The Conventional Understanding
The existence of imperfect information is thought to justify
legal intervention, according to conventional understanding, because consumers cannot contract in their own best interests without
the data to rank the purchase choices that markets offer.4 This
4

For example, part of the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act and the
Consumer Leasing Act is
to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will
be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him
and avoid the uninformed use of credit . . . [and] to assure a meaningful
disclosure of the terms of leases . . . so as to enable the lessee to
compare more readily the various lease terms available to him . . . [and]

enable comparison of lease terms with credit terms where appropriate ....
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601(a), (b) (1976). See also SENATE Comm. ON BANrNG AND
CURRENCY, THE TRUTH IN LENDmNG AcT OF 1967, S.REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-2 (1967); HousE Comm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, CoNsUME.nR CREDrr
PRoTEcTION AcT, H.R. BEP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-10 (1967), reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1962-66; NATroNAL CommNx ON
CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDrr m Tm UNITED STATES 171-75 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as CONSUMER CREDrrI].
Many articles also recite similar statements about the Truth in Lending Act
and other legislation of this type. E.g., Landers & Chandler, The Truth in Lending
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understanding implies that in determining whether to intervene in
a given market decisionmakers should ask whether each (i.e., an
idealized) consumer is sufficiently informed to make purchase choices
that maximize his own utility.5 For example, assume three firms
sell a homogeneous 1 product for $2, $3, and 4, respectively. A consumer pays $4 because he is unaware of the existence of lower prices.
Imperfect information prevented this consumer from making the
utility maximizing contract choice-a purchase at the lowest price. 7
Legal intervention in this or any other market should be designed
to enable each individual consumer to make the optimal choice, or
otherwise to protect him from the consequences of making uninformed choices.
The most common methods of protecting consumers in such
situations are to have the state impose standards for purchase terms
or take action to reduce information acquisition costs.8 Courts
Act and Variable-Rate Mortgages and Balloon Notes, 1976 A.M. B. FoUND. BES. J.
35, 64; MacIntyre, Fair Packaging and the Informed Consumer, 41 N.Y. ST. B.J.
687 (1969); Thain, Credit Advertising and the Law: Truth in Lending and Related
Matters, 1976 WAsH. U. L.Q. 257, 258; 1973 Wis. L. REv. 290, 295. All of the
rationales usually given apparently reduce to the claim that uninformed consumers
cannot contract in their own best interests. It is also occasionally said that providing
consumers with more information will increase competition, but the nexus between
informing consumers and the existence and normative desirability of competitive
markets is Largely unexplained in the legal literature.
5"Utility" refers to the level of satisfaction a consumer derives from the consumption of a particular good. For general discussions of utility and other basic
microeconomic concepts discussed in this Article, see P.S UStLSoN, EcoNomsIcs
(10th

ed. 1976); F. Scrm, TNDUSTUAL MARmET STnucTuRu

AND

ECONOIC

PmROmaANcE (1970).
'Troduct homogeneity implies that the offerings of rival sellers are alike in all
significant physical and subjective respects, so that they are virtually perfect substitutes in the minds of consumers. With perfect homogeneity, there remains only
one dimension along which rivalrous actions and counteractions can take place:
price."

F. SCHEHER, supra note 5, at 186.

7A modified version of this illustration was often used to explain the need for

a truth in lending law. Firms were said to quote the price of credit in such complex
and confusing ways that consumers could not readily ascertain what the price was,
and consequently would sometimes pay a higher price than necessary. See, e.g.,
Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MicH. L. REv.
1285, 1293-94 (1966).
s Two kinds of imperfect information may prevent a consumer from making
utility-maximizing choices. One problem is that consumers may know of available
options but lack the information fully to evaluate them. Thus, consumers know that
all goods have prices but may be unaware of where to find low prices or be unable
to compute actual charges for credit purchases or loan interest rates. See note 7
supra & accompanying text.
Another type of information problem arises in cases in which a consumer is
ignorant of some elements of the set of options from which he must choose. For
example, a consumer may not know that certain drugs produce dangerous side
effects, and thus may make the wrong choice, as measured by his own self-interest,
from a set of options that includes taking drug X (dangerous but efficacious), drug
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determine purchase terms by refusing to enforce particular contract
clauses; legislatures determine purchase terms by statutorily prohibiting some clauses and requiring others. Two justifications for
such a determination of purchase terms follow from the conventional analysis. First, if all consumers have identical preference
rankings and a court or legislature is in a better position than
market participants to ascertain which purchase choices are consistent with this ranking, state determination of the terms will
maximize each person's utility. Assume, for example, that all consumers prefer insurance against injuries caused by the products they
purchase, but are unable to understand the language of warranty
disclaimers imposing the risk of these injuries on buyers. A state
prohibition of such disclaimers is then optimal.
Second, a standard objection to such state intervention in consumer markets is that individuals know their preferences better
than public decisionmakers do. This assumption becomes untenable, however, when individuals are imperfectly informed. Consequently, when a condition of imperfect information exists, decisionmakers should feel less constrained in substituting their view of
what constitutes a fair exchange for the outcomes reached by private
agreements. As an illustration, some consumers, unaware of the
legal and personal consequences of giving security, may mistakenly
agree to contracts granting broad security interests to the sellers of
goods they purchase; these consumers actually may prefer to pay
higher interest rates for financing installment purchases rather than
bear the risk of harsh repossessions. In these circumstances, the
contracts will not reflect consumer preferences. Thus, a court or
legislature that believes it to be fair to limit the scope of security
Y (harmless but less powerful), or no drug at all. Reducing the costs of becoming
informed apparently would only protect consumers from the former kind of information gaps; a consumer will not alter his behavior when he is ignorant of other
options, whether or not the state makes it cheaper for him to evaluate these
alternatives. If, however, the method of reducing the costs of acquiring information
is conceived broadly to include making it cheaper for consumers to learn of the
full set of options they actually face, the distinction between the two kinds of
information gaps loses functional significance. Warning consumers of the dangers
that particular drugs pose, in this latter view, is in fact an aspect of the method of
protecting the consumer by reducing his costs of becoming informed.
This Article nevertheless focuses mainly on cases in which the consumer knows,
in at least a vague sense, of the market options he faces-that prices vary, warranties and security interests are "broad" or "narrow," and so forth. The textual
illustrations should be taken to refer to market options that are known in this sense.
This focus is adopted because American law is primarily concerned with information
gaps allegedly resulting from the high costs of fully evaluating known options.
Also, the question what should be done when consumers are unaware of some of
the options they face raises theoretical problems that current economic analysis has
not yet resolved.
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interests that consumers can grant 9 or to prevent repossessions without judicial process 10 should simply direct such outcomes, for the
argument that the contracts to which consumers have agreed demonstrate contrary consumer preferences is factually incorrect.
According to conventional wisdom, however, reduction of information acquisition costs, other things being equal, is preferable
to legislative or judicial determination of contract terms, because
reducing information costs enables individuals to make informed
choices to maximize their own utility. Because consumers seldom
have identical preference rankings, external determination of terms
rarely is optimal. Also, if one accepts the notion that decisionmakers should intervene to regulate contract terms only if consumers
are uninformed, then it is incumbent upon the state to attempt to
create conditions under which informed contract choices can be
made. Because more consumers will become informed if information acquisition costs are decreased, reducing these costs is
thought to be the preferable response to the problem of imperfect
information. 1 Regulating terms is therefore a second best solution,
to be used primarily by the judiciary, because courts cannot create
and police disclosure schemes. In keeping with this conventional
analysis, many of the recently enacted consumer protection laws
require firms to disclose information rather than to contract on
2
state-supplied terms.1
B. Difficulties with the Conventional Understandingand the
Appropriate Role of Imperfect Information
This conventional understanding of the relevance of imperfect
information to consumer protection law suffers from two related
difficulties: the analysis often fails to provide direction to decisionmakers seeking to ascertain the appropriate occasions and methods
for legal intervention, and it incorrectly focuses on individuals
rather than on the markets in which they purchase. With respect
to the former difficulty, consumer information-acquisition costs
("search costs") can be reduced in a variety of ways, but these
9
E.g., UNrFomax CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §3.301(1), authorizing consumers
to grant only purchase money security interests.

10 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
11 This argument also holds when consumers are unaware of the options they
face. Warning of the dangers drugs pose thus enables a consumer to make the
utility-maximzing choice from the now fully perceived set of options.
12See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1637 (1976) (right of
rescission as to certain transactions; open-end consumer credit plans); UNwoRm
CONSUNMR CEDrr CODE § 3.202 (consumer leases).
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methods in turn impose other kinds of costs on firms and consumers.
The conventional view, however, generates no criteria for determining which methods of reducing search costs are "better" or
"more effective" or "cost justified." Thus, legislatures must choose
without guidance among a congeries of potentially useful, as well
as potentially useless, regulations.
Moreover, the conventional analysis is inadequate as a means
of ascertaining when intervention on the basis of imperfect information is necessary and whether such intervention should require
disclosure or should determine contract terms. The question essential to conventional analysis is whether the typical consumer has
enough information to make utility maximizing purchase choices.
The most convenient way to answer this inquiry is to draw inferences from information levels held by actual consumers as a class.
This is easy to do in the case of polar extremes. If scarcely anyone
is informed, the typical consumer cannot be expected to be informed, but if almost everyone is informed or through disclosure
legislation could become informed, a decisionmaker could conclude
that the typical consumer is presently informed or that the consumer
could become informed.
These polar extremes, however, rarely occur in actual markets;
thus decisionmakers frequently encounter great difficulty in deciding
whether the typical consumer has enough information to make an
informed purchase. Generally, there are a significant number of
informed consumers in any given market prior to legal intervention;
moreover, a substantial number of consumers may remain uninformed even after the enactment of disclosure legislation.'3 The
crucial question of conventional analysis-whether consumers can
readily acquire the information necessary to make utility-maximizing purchase choices-thus turns on the decisionmakers' estimate of
the percentage of informed consumers in the market and whether
this percentage is sufficient to support an inference that the typical
consumer has access to adequate information at a reasonable cost.
The conventional analysis fails to provide criteria to aid decisionmakers in ascertaining the sufficient percentage, except insofar as
preferences for a particular course of action follow from the presuppositions of decisionmakers as to how much effort consumers
should commit to informing themselves. For example, if a decision13 For example, some consumers had reasonably accurate information respecting
the interest rates they paid prior to the enactment of the Truth in Lending Act,
while some consumers had inaccurate information after the Act's passage. See, e.g.,
Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the
Efficacy of the Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. FINANCE 1143, 1153 (1971).
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maker believes that people ought to work hard at making wise transactions, he may be satisfied if thirty percent of the consumers in a
market presently know the facts, believing that this level of information is sufficient to demonstrate that consumers can take care of
themselves. Thus the conventional analysis in practice seldom gives
decisionmakers useful guidance. The conventional view is simply
not helpful in determining how much information is "enough." 14
The second difficulty with the conventional mode of analysis is
that it mistakenly focuses on individuals rather than on markets.
To perceive the nature of this mistake, it is useful first to observe
that consumers differ in their shopping behavior. Some consumers
consult a variety of information sources, such as newspapers, friends,
or consumer periodicals, visit several stores before purchasing, and
plan purchases carefully over long time periods; others consult few
or no information sources, visit only the store of purchase, and do
not seriously plan ahead. But a third group, apparently larger fhan
the first two, engages in moderate search. 15
4

The debate over the need for a truth in lending law illustrates this shortcoming of conventional analysis. Professor Kripke expressed the view that the law
would accomplish little "because the middle class buyer has already learned where
credit is cheapest." Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1969) (footnote omitted). See also Kripke, Consumer Credit
Regulation: A Creditor-OrientedViewpoint, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 445, 460-66 (1968).
Professors Landers and Chandler, however, claimed that "consumers' knowledge of
the cost of credit [was] woefully inadequate" prior to the passage of the Truth in
Lending Act, and that the law itself "seems to have had a minimal impact"
Landers & Chandler, supra note 4, at 65. A debate in these terms must necessarily
be inconclusive.
Another illustration is provided by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), which
requires increased disclosure of warranty provisions partly "to improve the adequacy
of information available to consumers." Id. § 230 2 (a). Professor Whitford surveyed new car buyers before the passage of the Act to ascertain whether they
understood the manner in which their warranty coverage was limited. The percentage of correct answers he obtained varied from 34% (maintenance required) to
64% (warranty length). Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case
Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. lbv. 1006, 1054-55. If these
percentages are typical for other consumer warranty provisions, were the disclosure
provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act necessary? The conventional analysis of
information problems cannot provide an answer.
Further, the relationship between informed consumers and market outcomes has
never been fully explored in the legal literature. This has led to considerable
uncertainty among those who support disclosure legislation. Thus, Senator Douglas,
the leading legislative proponent of the Truth in Lending Act, argued that "only
. . . 10 percent cost conscious" consumers can "police" the market. Quoted in
CONSU MR Cnmrr, supra note 4, at 176. The National Commission on Consumer
Finance, however, claimed that "effective price competition" would result if "somewhere between one-third and one-half of the prospects are aware [of interest rates]
and if some portion shop for credit." Id. Neither Senator Douglas nor the Commission justified the percentages of informed consumers each claimed would be
necessary to achieve the Truth in Lending Act's goal.
15The classic study of how consumers search for purchase information is
Katona & Mueller, A Study of Purchase Decisions, in 1 CoNsUN R BEHAvIoR: Tun
3
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The presence of at least some consumer search in a market
creates the possibility of a "pecuniary externality": persons who
search sometimes protect nonsearchers from overreaching firms. 16
This result can obtain because in mass transactions it is usually too
expensive for firms to distinguish among extensive, moderate, and
nonsearchers. Also, it would often be too expensive to draft different contracts for each of these groups even if they could conveniently
be identified. Thus, if enough searchers exist, firms have incentives
both to compete for their business and to offer the same terms to
nonsearchers. When the preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the preferences of nonsearchers, competition among
firms for searchers should tend to protect all consumers. it Therefore, the conventional analysis asks the wrong question. Rather
than asking whether an idealized individual is sufficiently informed
to maximize his own utility, the appropriate normative inquiry is
whether competition among firms for particular groups of searchers
is, in any given market, sufficient to generate optimal prices and
terms for all consumers.
When the issue is viewed in this light, it is also possible to give
decisionmakers more guidance in deciding when and how to intervene on the basis of imperfect information. This is because the
problem reduces to the roughly answerable question whether the
market in which a set of challenged prices or contracts were made
is behaving competitively. The competitive price is the lowest price
a market can sustain, and all consumers would, other things equal,
prefer to purchase at the lowest price. Therefore, if enough searchers exist to generate a competitive price, all consumers who buy
will maximize utility with respect to price. To refer to the illustration above, if the competitive price were $2 and all firms charged
it,18 an uninformed consumer's purchase would maximize his utility
DYNAMncs oF CoNsUMER REACTION

30, 49, 52, 79-80 (L. Clark ed. 1954).

Recent

studies describing consumer search behavior include Claxton, Fry & Portis, A Taxonomy of Prepurchase Information Gathering Patterns, J. CoNsumER REsEARcH, Dec.
1974, at 35; Newman, Consumer External Search: Amount and Determinants, in
CONSumE
AND INDUsTmaIL Buxnc BEHAVIOR 79 (1977); Newman & Staelin,
Prepurchase Information Seeking for New Cars and Major Household Appliances,
9 J. MAR:KETNG REsEARcH 249 (1972).
16That consumers who search benefit consumers who do not has previously
been noted. See Salop & Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically
Competitive Price Dispersion,44 Rv. ECON. STuDr. 493, 494, 501 (1977). See also
Rothschild, Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey,
81 1. PoLmcAL ECON. 1283 (1973); Wilde, Labor Market Equilibrium Under
Nonsequential Search, 16 J. ECON. THEoRY 373 (1977).
17 This argument presupposes that firms do not discriminate among consumers
on the basis of relative knowledge or sophistication. We consider below the implications of relaxing this assumption. See text accompanying notes 76-82 infra.
1i If the market is assumed to be competitive, all firms will by definition charge
the competitive price. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 5, at 58-73.
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even though he bought at the first store he visited and did not know
the prices charged by other firms. Similarly, because there is no
reason at present to believe that consumers who search differ widely
in their preferences respecting purchase terms from consumers who
do not search, competition among firms for the business of those
consumers who are term conscious would probably generate contract
clauses that are utility-maximizing for nonsearchers. 19 Recent economic models provide some assistance in ascertaining when markets
are behaving competitively with respect to prices and contract terms,
and in devising methods of moving markets toward competitive
equilibria. These models are considered next.
Before beginning this discussion some preliminary observations
should be made. Under current contract and commercial law, the
existence of imperfect information is a necessary but generally not
sufficient condition for legal intervention. 20 An additional prerequisite is the existence of substantively unfair contract terms. The
argument to this point, however, shows that imperfect information
should constitute a sufficient ground for intervention. This is because an intervention on information grounds is justified only if a
market is found to be behaving noncompetitively; and in our society
supracompetitive prices or terms are generally considered to be substantively unfair. On the other hand, no consensus exists that the
outcomes of competitive markets are always fair, and we take no
position in this Article on whether the state should regulate contract terms on grounds of substantive fairness when information
problems are absent.

21

19A "harsh" contract clause, such as a broad disclaimer, shifts many risks to
consumers, while a "gentle" clause, such as a broad warranty, shifts risks to firms.
Consumers who choose harsh clauses in return for lower prices are less risk-averse
than those who choose gentle ones. If the consumers who shop for contract terms
always choose harsh (or gentle) clauses, it may be possible to infer that searchers
are either less or more risk-averse than nonsearchers; consequently, competition
among firms for the business of searchers could yield contract clauses that would
not be utility-maximizing for the nonsearchers. But because no evidence that
searchers always choose particular kinds of terms exists, it seems safe to assume
that the degree of risk aversion does not correlate strongly with the extent of search.
This aside, poor consumers may be somewhat more willing than middle class consumers to trade lower prices for bearing more purchase risks. See Schwartz, A
Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1058-59
(1977). Poor consumers, however, often purchase in distinct markets. See generally
FEDERAL TRADE CoI'jmIssoN, EcoNOM-Ic REPORT ON INsTA.,LwrNT CREDrr AND
.ETAIL SALEs PRACTIcEs OF DISRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILMS (1968); Kunreuther,

Why the Poor May Pay More for Food: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence, 46
J. Bus. 368, 375-78 (1973).
20J. WHTE & R. SummERs, HAMBOOK OF T E LAW uNDER THE UNwoRM

CONIERzCIA. CODE 118-19, 128 (1972).
21The argument to this point assumes that an intervention on information
grounds cannot be justified if a market is already competitive, because competitive
markets generate prices and terms that are utility-maximizing for all consumers.
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II. THE BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS CHARACTERIZED BY
IMPERFECT INFORMATION

A. The Nature of the Analysis
The study of economic problems uses both optimization and
equilibrium techniques. The former method focuses on individual
actors, who are presumed to maximize or minimize some relevant
measure-individuals maximize utility, firms minimize costs. The
economist's task is to characterize the optimization strategies actors
pursue, and to describe the results of pursuing such strategies for
these individuals. Equilibrium analysis focuses on the interaction of
economic agents in markets; this method is used to characterize the
outcomes markets are likely to generate when individual actors
pursue particular optimization strategies. 22 Equilibrium analysis is
essential to a discussion of information problems because the normative questions that should concern decisionmakers largely reduce to
whether markets are or can be made competitive.
In employing equilibrium analysis it is often helpful to model
markets as games. The "players" are firms and consumers. Each
of the players pursues some goal, such as profit maximization or
minimization of net purchase costs, and chooses a strategy for achieving the goal. "Solution concepts" 23 then characterize the outcomes
(equilibria) particular games generate when the players pursue
specified strategies. The solution concept most frequently used
today is the "Nash equilibrium." 24 A system is at a Nash equilibrium if, given that all other players continue to pursue their present
strategies, each player would optimize by continuing to pursue his
present course of conduct. In such a case, no player has an incen23
tive to alter his strategy; the system is at an equilibrium.
This abstract description can be illuminated by a relatively
simple example. Consumers in a purely competitive market are
presumed to have perfect information, face zero search costs, and
desire to purchase at the lowest price. The only Nash equilibrium
in this ideal market is at the competitive price. To establish this
conclusion, it may initially be observed that a situation in which
firms charge different prices cannot be an equilibrium. A firm
Below we discuss possible efficiency and fairness objections to this premise.
text accompanying notes 83-88 infra.

See

22 A good introduction to equilibrium analysis is A. CIANc, FuNmsAnAL
METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONONUCs 39-58 (2d ed. 1974).
23 W.

BA-UMOL, ECONO iC

THEORY AND

OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS 440-43

(4th

ed. 1977).
24
25

(1957).

See R. LucE & H. RAiFFA, GAmms AND DECISIONS 170 (1957).

For a fuller explanation of the Nash equilibrium concept, see id. 170-79
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quoting a price higher than that of other firms would have no
customers, because consumers who knew the price each firm charged
and who could costlessly travel from firm to firm would never buy
at a price above the market minimum. The high-price sellers thus
would alter their strategy by reducing prices to the market minimum
or exiting if the low-price sellers continued to pursue their pricing
strategies. Price dispersion therefore cannot constitute a Nash
equilibrium.
Moreover, the only single price at which the market would be
in equilibrium is the competitive price. Once a market reaches the
competitive price firms no longer have an incentive to lower their
prices because the competitive price is at the minimum point of
each firm's average cost curve; price cuts below this point would
consequently yield losses.26 It is equally true that firms would have
no incentive to raise their prices if all other firms continued to
charge the competitive price because a firm that raised its price
would have no customers. Perfectly informed consumers would
27
purchase from the price-raising firm's competitors.
The next part of this Article describes models that illustrate
Nash equilibria in markets characterized by imperfect information.
These models, like the example just given, relate the optimization
strategies of consumers and firms to the outcomes markets generate.
Because there unfortunately is little hard data respecting how consumers and firms optimize under conditions of uncertainty, part II
(B) thus spends some time describing and analyzing the assumptions
currently made respecting such optimization strategies.
B. The Behavior of Markets Characterized by
Imperfect Information
1. Common Features of Search Equilibrium Models
The search equilibrium models discussed below 28 1 share several
assumptions respecting firms, products and consumers. Firms maximize profits, but pursue relatively passive strategies. Each firm sets
26 See P. SAmuELsoN, supra note 5, at 470.
2
7The previous two paragraphs describe a "static equilibrium model." Such
models do not explain how markets out of equilibrium reach equilibrium; they do
not, that is, describe dynamic processes. Static equilibrium models instead characterize the kinds of equilibria a market can sustain. The formal models discussed
below are all static equilibrium models. Although dynamic models would be useful
for understanding market phenomena, dynamic modeling is not sufficiently advanced
to generate useable policy instruments.
28 Many of these models are reviewed in Rothschild, supra note 16. For a
more recent survey, see Wilde, Market Search Models: A Selective Survey, California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper #133 (1976) (copy on
file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).

642

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 127:630

a price, charges this price to each consumer, waits to see who buys,
and alters its price when this would increase expected profits. In
these models, firms do not advertise, and all firms in a given market
sell homogeneous goods on terms that differ, when they differ, only
on price. The probable effects of relaxing all of these assumptions
will be considered later,29 but for now they are necessary to the
analysis. 30
Search equilibrium models assume that consumers are interested primarily in prices (since it is assumed that the goods are
homogeneous) and act to maximize expected utility. Before entering the market, each consumer decides, on the basis of his income,
tastes, and alternative opportunities, the maximum or "limit" price
he will pay. Search equilibrium models typically assume, for expositional convenience, that all consumers in a market have a common "limit price." 31 This common limit price may be thought
of as the monopoly price because it is the price a monopolist would
charge were he confronted with a set of consumers who would pay
this price but no more.8 2 Finally, the models assume that consumers become informed only by visiting firms; they do not read
advertisements (formally there are no advertisements) or consult
other information sources.3 3 The effect of relaxing this assumption
is also considered below.3 4
Because firms seek to maximize profits, it logically follows that
a Nash equilibrium could occur only if no firm can increase profits
by changing its price. A further important equilibrium condition
of search models is that no firms desire to enter or exit the market.
This is captured mathematically by assuming that in equilibrium
all firms earn zero profits.
29

See text accompanying notes 69-82 infra.

3OAn additional assumption is that a large number of firms exist. The object
is to characterize equilibria in markets in which, imperfect information aside, the
usual competitive assumptions hold true.
31 See sources cited in note 16 supra.
32 Consumers of course would have individual limit prices. One could derive
for each firm a demand function (telling the firm the highest price it could profitably
charge) from the distribution of individual limit prices, but this is not done because
the models' results are qualitatively unchanged under the simplifying assumption.
Respecting the realism of the assumption that consumers have limit prices, a recent
article observed that one can say "with reasonable certainty" that "the consumer
enters the market not with a single price in mind, but with a range of acceptable
prices." Gardner, The Role of Price in Consumer Choice, in SmLcT.cD ASPECTS OF
CONstumn B _Avion, 415, 427 (NSF/RA 77-0013, 1977). Researchers also have
surveyed consumers and report finding maximum acceptable prices.

Mueller, supra note 15, at 47-48; authorities cited in note 55 infra.
33 See sources cited in note 16 supra.
3

4 See text accompanying notes 57 & 59-62 infra.

See Katona &
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2. Sequential Search Models in Which Consumers
Know the Price Distribution
Many early search models 35 assumed that consumers use a
sequential strategy when they shop. A consumer acting according
to this strategy visits firms in sequence according to the rule that
search should continue until the marginal cost of further search is
greater than or equal to the marginal gain. The gain is measured
by the likelihood that an additional store visit will produce a lower
price. The price for each consumer at which the marginal cost of
further search equals the marginal gain is referred to as the consumer's "reservation price"; it is the maximum price at which the
consumer will purchase, provided that it is less than or equal to his
limit price. Because the expected gain that each consumer perceives search to yield is a function of that consumer's estimate of
the probability of finding various lower prices, the consumer's optimal search strategy cannot be characterized precisely without describing how the consumer incorporates his subjective view of the
actual price distribution into the calculation of his reservation price.
The optimization problem that characterizing such a strategy entails, however, presently cannot be solved if the consumer is assumed
not to know the distribution of prices he faces. Thus, search equilibrium models commonly make the unrealistic assumption that
when consumers decide how much search to engage in they know
the overall price distribution but not the specific price each firm
charges.
A brief description of the single price equilibria that can obtain is sufficient to indicate the policy implications of common
sequential search models. If the consumers in these models are
assumed to face positive search costs, the only equilibrium is at the
common limit or monopoly price, "P,,." 30 If the market were at
a single price, P, less than P, a firm could raise its price by some
amount without losing customers. A consumer in this case would
compare the gain of purchasing from a competitor who continued
to charge the lower "old" price with the cost of switching, and if
35
.E.g., Arrow & Rothschild, Preliminary Notes on Equilibrium Price Distributions with Limited Information, The Economics Series, Institute of Mathematical
Studies in the Social Sciences, Working Paper #34, Stanford University (1973)

(copy on file at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); Diamond, A Model
of Price Adjustment, 3 J. ECON. ThEoRY 156 (1971); McCall, The Economics of
Information and Optimal Stopping Rules, 38 J. Bus. 300 (1965).
36 See Arrow & Rothschild, supra note 35; Butters, Market Allocation through
Search: Equilibrium Adjustment and Price Dispersion: Comment, 15 J. EcoN.
THEoRY 225 (1977); Diamond, supra note 35, at 165.
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the price rise was made smaller than the cost to any consumer of
switching, no consumer would switch. The only price at which
this seller strategy fails is PL; a firm charging more than the limit
price would make no sales. Thus, only the monopoly price can be
a Nash equilibrium. At any lower price, a firm has an incentive
to alter its strategy: the firm will raise its price if other firms continue to pursue their strategy of charging the same price.
When the market is at the monopoly price, no firm has an incentive to lower its price. Because sequential search models assume
that consumers learn a store's price only by visiting it, a consumer
will not switch to the single price-cutting firm because the probability of finding the one firm charging less than P., when many
firms exist, is too low to make switching an optimal shopping
37
strategy. Thus the market price remains at Pr.
The monopoly price would not be an equilibrium in sequential search models, however, if an appreciable number of consumers
could search costlessly. In such a case, firms could increase profits
by cutting prices, and reduce profits by raising prices. For example,
were a market to reach the monopoly price, a given firm would
increase revenue by cutting prices; since consumers know the price
distribution, they would realize that a price cutter exists, and those
who could costlessly search would find and switch to the price-cutting firm. Because individual firms could increase profits by
cutting prices, the monopoly price could not be an equilibrium.
Further, if a substantial number of consumers faced zero search
costs, only the competitive price would be an equilibrium. If the
market were at a price less than P,, any firm that raised its price
would lose those of its customers who could search costlessly, for
they would switch to firms whose prices had not changed. Thus if
a large number of consumers faced zero search costs, it would never
benefit a firm to raise prices if its rivals did not also raise their
prices. And, as shown above, a firm would profit from cutting
prices if its rivals failed to follow suit. The price cutting strategy
fails, however, when the market is at the competitive price. In a
37 In a market with very few firms, price cutting could be an optimal strategy
for a firm to follow if all other firms continued to charge the monopoly price. The
odds that consumers would find a price-cutting firm vary inversely with the number
of firms; consequently, consumers are more likely to search for price cutters when
very few firms exist. In such a case, however, the costs to firms of colluding to
raise prices are reduced, for collusion costs also vary inversely with the number of
firms. See L. Surmivm-i, HAinBoox OF THE LAW OF ANaurrauST 161-63 (1977).
Neither information nor oligopoly theory has yet developed models describing the

outcomes reached by oligopoly markets affected by imperfect information, apparently because of the difficulty of characterizing the strategies firms pursue when
they have incentives both to cut and collusively raise prices.
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competitive market, each firm is operating at the point at which
price equals minimum average cost; therefore no further price cuts
would occur. When a substantial portion of consumers face zero
search costs, then, the only single price equilibrium a market can
sustain is the competitive equilibrium. When the market reached
the competitive price no firm would have an incentive to increase
or decrease its price. 38
This conclusion unfortunately seems useless to policy makers.
In the real world all consumers face positive search costs, and no
legislative action could reduce anyone's costs to zero.
A departure from pure theory, however, suggests that the analysis may be useful to decisionmakers. Search equilibrium models
commonly assume that sellers do not advertise.39 Informative advertising, however, increases the chance that switching from firm to
firm would be an optimal strategy for consumers to follow, and that
price cuts would thus be optimal for firms. This function of advertising may be understood by assuming that a market is at the
monopoly price. A firm then cuts its price and runs newspaper
advertisements. As consumers in consequence are able to find this
firm relatively cheaply, some of them may patronize it. Informative
advertising thus tends to drive prices downward and thereby helps
to prevent the existence of monopoly equilibria. Because legislative intervention to cure information problems is often expensive,
these search equilibrium models suggest that when price advertising
is common, decisionmakers should be cautious when deciding
whether to intervene on the basis of imperfect information. A
more detailed discussion of this and other policy implications is
found in parts III and V of this Article.
3

SSalop and Stiglitz recently created a search equilibrium model in which consumers face two search options: to pay a set price and obtain a list of every firm
charging the lowest price in the market, or to visit one firm at random and pay
whatever price that firm charges. Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 16, at 495. In the
Salop-Stiglitz model, a competitive equilibrium can occur only if a substantial number
of consumers face zero search costs. Should all consumers face positive search
costs, a firm could increase profits if it raised its price above the competitive price
by an amount less than the cost to consumers of paying the set price to become
perfectly informed. Thus the competitive price cannot be an equilibrium.
39
An exception is Butters, supra note 2. Professor Butters assumed that firms
advertise only by sending to all potential buyers slips of paper on which are written
the product type-e.g., "a pen"-and the price. Buyers can costlessly process all
such advertisements they receive but they obtain no other product information.
From these conditions he generated an equilibrium price distribution in which one
firm charged the competitive price, another the limit or monopoly price, and all other
firms were in between, no two firms charging the same price. The restrictiveness
of his assumptions together with the improbability of this outcome actually obtaining

suggest that his interesting theoretical models would not provide useful guidance to
policymakers.
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Even if one interprets these search models as merely suggestive
of useful policy implications, they have two significant limitations
as guides to policy makers. First, as noted earlier, the assumption
that consumers know the true price distribution but not the identity of the firms charging each price is unrealistic. When a model
or set of models has not been verified empirically and some of its
specifications seem implausible, the conclusions it supports should
be taken as suggestions to consider, not directions to follow. Second,
no model that presupposes that consumers know the price distribution has plausibly characterized the conditions that can sustain
multiple price equilibria. Real world markets, however, frequently
are characterized by price dispersion. Thus, the search equilibrium
models this section describes often will give decisionmakers little
help in evaluating actual market outcomes.
The next two sections of this Article 40 discuss the model proposed by the authors,41 a model that makes more plausible assumptions with respect to how consumers search and what they know
about the prices they face. This model, in consequence, is somewhat more helpful in answering the question whether particular
real world price distributions are close to the competitive ideal.
3. A Fixed Sample Size Model Assuming Consumers Do Not
Know the Price Distribution
This model assumes that consumers are ignorant of the price
distribution for a product before they begin to search. 42 Economists
generally suppose in this case that consumers also use a pure sequential strategy. 43 A simple example illustrates this notion. Suppose
that all prices in a market cluster around a point. A consumer who
follows a fixed sample size strategy will decide before shopping how
many stores to visit. If he has decided on a sample of five, he will
visit all five stores although, in this illustration, his search would
quickly reveal little price diversity. A sequential searcher by con40

See text accompanying notes 42-51 infra.
This model is presented formally in Wilde & Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 45 REv. Eco. ST=D. (forthcoming 1979). Readers interested in
41

the mathematics underlying the heuristic explanation the text next provides should
refer to this paper.
42A consumer is considered not to know the price distribution if he has little
specific knowledge of the prices the market offers. A consumer would be ignorant
of the price distribution in this sense although he knew that a nineteen-inch color
television set would be unlikely to cost him less than $200 or more than $650.
43
See, e.g., Rothschild, Searching for the Lowest Price When the Distribution
of Prices is Unknown, 82 J. PorxcALr EcoN. 689, 694-96 (1974).
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trast would probably stop searching after visting only a few stores,
because he correctly infers that further search will reveal similar
prices. The sequential searcher would purchase at the same price
as the fixed sample size searcher, but at a lower overall cost because
he visits fewer stores. The sequential strategy is thus superior to
the fixed sample size strategy because it enables consumers to make
better use of the information that searching reveals.
Recent analyses suggest, however, that consumers could rationally include nonsequential elements in their search strategies. 44
Initially, consumers who search sequentially against an unknown
price distribution may make more costly errors than consumers who
keep to preset samples. Sequential searchers can mistake the significance of a price similarity that initial store visits may reveal and
stop searching too soon, or they can mistake the significance of an
initial price diversity and search longer than the actual price distribution warrants. On the other hand, consumers who stay within
preset sample sizes seldom radically over or underinvest in search.
Further, experiments suggest that consumers come much closer to
obtaining the optimal payoff that their strategies permit when they
use fixed samples rather than search sequentially.45 Risk-averse
consumers ignorant of the price distribution may therefore rationally incorporate fixed sample size elements into their search strategy.
Furthermore, some consumers search because they enjoy shopping.
Since a sequential strategy is useful only for minimizing search costs
-the sequence could end at one store visit if that visit reveals a
very low price-consumers who shop partly for pleasure may visit a
preset number of stores. Finally, when fixed costs are associated
with search activity, visiting several stores may be optimal. For
example, if a consumer's major expense is getting to the shopping
district, he may choose to visit a preset number of stores when he
arrives there because the more store visits he makes the lower the
average cost of visiting each store.
4. A Mixed Strategy Model
Intuition suggests that consumers actually use mixed search
strategies. Because of the advantages of a fixed sample size strategy,
44

Cf. Gastwirth, On ProbabilisticModels of Consumer Search For Information,
90 QJ. EcoN. 38 (1976) (questioning sequential search models that assume consumer knowledge of price distributions).
45 See Fried & Peterson, Information Seeking: Optional Versus Fixed Stopping,
80 I. Exp~meNTAL PsYcH. 525 (1969).
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especially when the price distribution is unknown, consumers probably do create and intend to exhaust a preset sample of stores before
purchasing. These samples, however, are flexible; a consumer who
sees at the outset of his search a price that his impressionistic expectation suggests is a "bargain" may buy at that price, even though
this means that he has not exhausted his sample.
All essential features of such a mixed strategy are captured in a
model that assumes that consumers set and keep within preset
samples, but that for some consumers the sample size is one while
for other consumers it is greater than one. This is because if they
actually follow mixed strategies, some consumers in any given market
can be expected to visit only one store while others are likely to
visit more than one store. The evidence, moreover, is consistent
with the existence of mixed strategies. In every market studied, a
considerable percentage of consumers, but not all, visit two or more
stores.4 6 Thus, we make the weak (i.e., realistic) assumption that
consumers pursue mixed strategies, which we capture with the
mathematically convenient metaphor that consumers use a fixed
sample size strategy with some samples equalling one.
The model also rests on two relatively weak assumptions respecting the way sample sizes are chosen: sample size varies inversely
with the cost of search 47 and directly with the potential gains from
search. Gains include the pleasure shopping may bring and the
lower prices it may reveal. Respecting the latter, because greater
price or quality variation may exist for higher priced than for lower
priced goods, more search-the visiting of more stores-should, and
48
actually does, occur for such goods.
46

See Bucklin, Testing Propensities to Shop, J. MARKE-ING, Jan., 1966, at 22,
23; Day & Brandt, A Study of Consumer Credit Decisions: Implications For Present
and Prospective Legislation, in THE NATIONAL COMAUSSION ON CONSuMmR FiN xcE,
1 TEcmicAL STuDiEs pt. 2, at 41-42 (1972); Udell, Prepurchase Behavior of Buyers
of Small ElectricalAppliances, J. MARKET-Gr, Oct. 1966, at 50, 52 (consumers prefer
to compare products at home using out-of-store sources of information).
4
7 See Bucklin, supra note 46, at 23-24; Newman, supra note 15; Swan, Search
Behavior Related to Expectations Concerning Brand Performance, 56 1. APPLD

PsycH. 332 (1972) (rewards and costs are taken into account by consumers choosing
between
brands).
48
See Katona & Mueller, supra note 15, at 46, 50, 66-68 (more search was
reported from durable goods buyers than sport shirt buyers); of. Claxton, Fry &

Portis, supra note 15, at 40 (a large proportion of people who search more
thoroughly state that high purchase price was a significant reason); Newman &

Staelin, supra note 15, at 255 (cost of product correlated positively with
behavior for car buyers who thought of a few makes at the outset, but did
correlate for car buyers who thought of one make at the outset).
Psychologists have created the concept of "perceived risk," which they
as the risk the consumer associates with the financial, social, and physical
quences that may flow from purchase of the product.

search
not so
define
conse-

The higher the degree of

perceived risk, they assert, the greater the amount of search, because search generates
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Given all of the foregoing assumptions, the model yields three
potential equilibria: (1) a single price equilibrium at the competitive price (although all consumers face positive search costs); (2) a
cluster of prices at the competitive price, with other prices spreading up to the monopoly price; and (3) a continuous price distribution bounded on the upper end by the monopoly price. The equilibrium that will occur in any given market is a function of the
number of consumers in that market who visit more than one firm,
and the size of the samples these consumers set.
The explanation of the first equilibrium is similar to the explanations developed above. If the market is at a single price, Po,
greater than the competitive price, Pa, a given firm could increase
profits by lowering its price by some amount. This firm would continue to get its share of those consumers who visit only one store.
It would also get every customer whose sample included two or more
stores and who visited the price cutter. Such "comparison shoppers" buy at the lowest price they see. Because when some consumers comparison shop at least one firm could increase profits by
undercutting Po, this price could not be an equilibrium; a situation
in which only Po is charged would be unstable. The price cutting
strategy only fails at the competitive price because average costs then
are minimized and further price cuts would be unprofitable. Thus,
when some consumers comparison shop, the only single price that
could be an equilibrium would be Pa, the competitive price. Further, if the market reached Pa and many consumers were comparison shoppers, no firm could increase profits by raising its price. Such
a firm would get only those consumers who visit one store; for consumers who visit two or more firms would not buy from the highprice firm. In consequence, this firm could charge as much as Pz,
but if too few nonshoppers exist, it still would earn no more (and
perhaps less) profit than if it had continued to charge Pa. Therefore, when a sufficient number of consumers always visit more than
one store, the competitive price is the only possible equilibrium.49
This result differs from the result indicated by conventional
search equilibrium models-where a competitive equilibrium could
not exist unless some consumers could search costlessly-because
some consumers in this model continue to search regardless of the
information, which can reduce the consumer's (subjectively) perceived risk. Thus
the psychological model also predicts greater search at higher prices. See J. ENGEL,
D. KOLLAT, & R. BLAcKwE,
CoNsutmR BmHvioi 240-41, 586-87 (3d ed. 1978).
49It is assumed that firms are not colluding to set and maintain a monopoly
price. See note 37 supra.

650

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12.7:630

price information revealed by store visits. Consumers probably consider the possibility of price variation in setting their samples, but
the reasons that lead them to include nonsequential elements in
their search strategies cause some consumers to visit all stores in these
samples notwithstanding that they may continually see similar prices.
Because some consumers always comparison shop, firms that cut
prices could be rewarded and firms that raise prices could be punished. The extent to which the prospect of reward or punishment
influences firm behavior depends upon the ratio of comparison
shoppers to the total number of shoppers in the market. If that
ratio is sufficiently great, the market will generate a competitive
equilibrium.
If the number of comparison shoppers is too small to support a
competitive equilibrium, but the number is nevertheless significant,
the market will sustain an equilibrium with a "mass point"-a
cluster of prices-at the competitive price and a price spread up to
PL, the monopoly price. A mass point above Pa, the competitive
price, could not exist for reasons similar to those just discussed: when
many firms charge a single price above Pa, a given firm could increase profits by cutting its price. A mass point can exist at Pa,
however, because it is the competitive price; firms whose prices are
forced down to Pa would not find it profitable to charge prices
below it. Not all firms, however, would be at this price. In this
second case, there are enough consumers who visit only one store to
make it profitable for some firms to "specialize" in selling to these
uninformed consumers at supracompetitive prices.
The final conclusion generated by this model is that when a
small number of consumers comparison shop, equilibrium entails a
price distribution with an upper bound of P,, the monopoly price.
Its range varies inversely with the number of comparison shoppers
and their shopping intensities; thus, when very few consumers shop,
prices will bunch up toward P..
The three outcomes of this model can be precisely characterized
mathematically." Let A, - the number of consumers who visit only
one store; An - the number of consumers who visit more than one
store; n = the number of stores each comparison shopper visits; F
each firm's fixed costs (including a return on investment); s the "capacity constraint," or level of output that minimizes average
cost; P -- the common limit price; 15 = each firm's marginal cost.
50
The derivation of the equations given in this section are not included in this
Article. The mathematical explanation of the origin and derivation of the equations

may be found in Wilde & Schwartz, supra note 41.
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s(Pz - P) ; an equilibrium with a mass point at the competitive price
can exist if and only if

nAn
n
> 1
A., + nAn

F
s(--

)i

An
n; and
n
+ An;
A ,~L-

nAn
a continuous price distribution can exist if and only if A c +nAn
nAn
I
F

<1-

S(Pz

-

)

Because consumers visit firms to compare prices, this model suggests that if a market is not behaving competitively the state should
consider methods of reducing the costs of comparison shopping in
that market; as search costs decrease, the likelihood of competitive
behavior will increase. This model also does not incorporate advertising. But it suggests, as do the models described above,15 that
informative advertising is quite useful in producing competitive behavior. A consumer who examines three advertisements has
sampled three stores, at least with respect to price. Finally, this
model may be useful to those who make state intervention decisions.
All of these policy implications are discussed in greater detail in
parts III to V below.

III.

DECIDING WHEN TO INTERVENE: AN ILLUSTRATION
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

This section illustrates how the economic analysis presented in
this Article can assist a decisionmaker in answering the relevant
normative question, whether imperfect information has caused a
market to behave noncompetitively. It will be useful to begin by
showing how a decisionmaker could in principle use the mixed
strategy model to answer this question precisely. Assume that our
hypothetical decisionmaker observes that all prices in a market for
electric clothes dryers cluster around some point. The mixed
strategy model suggests that the market is at a competitive equi61 See text accompanying notes 39 & 40 supra.
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librium. The concept of a "cluster," however, is vague. The model
also predicts that when there are few comparison shoppers the price
distribution will bunch toward the monopoly price. When market prices seem close to each other, therefore, the decisionmaker
could be observing either the competitive outcome or an outcome
approaching the monopoly price.
Suppose that the highest observed price is $450. The decisionmaker could sample consumers to ascertain their limit prices. If
the sample mean is well above the highest observed price-for example $700-the market is competitive. Because at least one seller
who could charge the monopoly price (P.) would do so, $450, the
highest observed price, could not be PL. But as the model allows
for no mass points above the competitive price, the observed cluster
must be the competitive price. If the sample mean, however, is
in the neighborhood of the highest observed price, the decisionmaker needs a method by which to determine whether a competitive
equilibrium exists. The mixed strategy model shows that this will
obtain if and only if A

An

>1

F
-

To illustrate how this model could be used, we shall initially
let X

=

A

An

+

An" Then X is the ratio of comparison shoppers-

people who visit two or more stores-to the total consumers in the
market. If a market is competitive, a firm's price can be represented by the equation p *

F

/ +- -.s

Now let the decisionmaker

observe a standard markup on variable costs in this market of one
hundred percent. Then p *

Substituting, 1 -

F

=

2 f. Because p *

becomes 1 -

j6

p1

F

S

F

F
S

Unless marginal

cost rises steeply, average variable cost can be a proxy for marginal
cost, and it is easier to ascertain. Assume that the average variable
cost observed was $200 per dryer. Finally, the sample mean of
limit prices, let us say, is $500. Thus P. ($500) = 2.5p (2.5 x
$200). Substituting in the equation for X, we get X > 1 -
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>1

1

.333.52 Thus if one third
.5

2.5l -

PL -

or more of the persons who purchase electric clothes dryers visit
more than one store, the observed price distribution would cluster
around the competitive price.
Empirical evidence indicates that thirty-five percent or more of
the purchasers of items such as clothes dryers visit two or more stores
before buying.53 Since consumers can also obtain comparative price
information by observing advertisements, this evidence actually
understates the amount of comparison shopping that occurs. 54 Thus,
52

Readers might observe that if Pz, the limit price, were only 1.5 times greater
than P, a firm's marginal cost, this equation yields absurd results (where Pz = 1.5p,
X > I

- f-

- 1).

Such results would not occur in practice. The model

shows that a competitive equilibrium occurs when the ratio of comparison shoppers
to all shoppers (X) > 1

(

)

where F is the firm's fixed cost and s is the

level of output that minimizes average cost. The part of the equation to the right
of the > sign will be less than one (thereby ensuring a positive percentage of
comparison shoppers) if s(Pz i) > F. The model in fact assumes that
s(Pz - f) > F, because in equilibrium Pz must equal the highest price in the
market. Thus, to say that s(P. - P) > F is to assume that a firm that operates at
"capacity" (s is the profit maximizing capacity) can recover its fixed cost, F (including a return on investment), when It charges the highest price the market will
permit (Pz). Were this condition unsatisfied, no firms would be in the market. As
firms will of course exist in any case in which the law is interested, the condition
s(Pz - P) > F will be satisfied, and the equation for X, when applied to real
markets, will yield a zero (no amount of comparison shoppers can generate a competitive equilibrium in this particular market) or a positive fraction (Y3 as in the
textual example).
To show that in equilibrium Pz would be the market's highest price, let the
highest price in a market be Pb where Pb < Pz. The firm charging Pb would
make sales only to those consumers who sample one firm; consumers who sample more
than one firm will not purchase from the firm charging Pb because it would be the
highest price they see. Thus the firm charging Pb would have an incentive to
raise its price above Pb because it would lose no customers. But the firm could not
charge more than Pz, for above Pz no sales are made. Thus the market's highest
price5 3(Pb) must equal Pz in equilibrium.
See, e.g., Bucklin, supra note 46, at 23 (61.7% of those looking for furniture
or large appliances reported two or more trips); Newman and Staelin, supra note 15
(35%of major appliance buyers visited two or more stores).
64 Methodological problems also cause many studies to understate the amount
of consumer search that actually occurs. These studies rest on surveys of consumers
taken from days to more than a year after the consumers purchased the items in
question. Consumers are unlikely to recall in detail the nature and number of
information sources consulted. Further, many indices of search measure the number
of categories of information sources consumers use-store visits, friends, ads,
articles-but do not count frequency of use within categories. Some active searchers
may therefore go undetected. Finally, studies of consumer search behavior usually
neglect information seeking within retail units. See Newman & Lockman,
Measuring PrepurchaseInformation Seeking, 2 J. CoNsumER B EsEcH 216 (1975).
These authors surveyed consumers after they shopped (for women's shoes) and also
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if the illustrative data respecting limit prices, markups, and average
variable cost are even approximately accurate, a decisionmaker who
saw a cluster of prices in an electric clothes dryer market could conclude that the market was competitive.
If the decisionmaker were instead to observe a cluster of prices
with some prices well above it, his task would be easier. The mixed
strategy model allows no mass points to occur except at the competitive price. Therefore, the decisionmaker would know that the
cluster represented the competitive price. By comparing the number of prices in the cluster with the total number of prices obtaining,
and their respective distances from the cluster, he could evaluate the
competitive state of the market.
This exercise teaches several valuable lessons. Initially, despite
the apparent precision of the analysis, the exercise shows that a real
world decisionmaker would encounter great difficulty in precisely
characterizing a market's competitive state. It would be quite difficult to ascertain limit prices accurately by sampling. The highest
prices consumers report they would pay may differ substantially
from the highest prices they in fact would pay because consumers
may weigh the costs and potential gains of purchases differently in
hypothetical and real situations. Further, methodologically sound
samples would have to be large, and for this and other reasons would
be expensive to obtain 5 Also, if a market contains firms that vary
widely in size, the "representative" markup and average variable
cost may not approximate reality closely. In addition, as the next
section of this Article 51 shows, the existence of product heterogeneity and possible firm discrimination among consumers can
greatly complicate the analysis. Finally, a decisionmaker would
have to decide which firms are actually in the market that he is
evaluating. The antitrust laws make the question of market definiobserved their search behavior. They found that consumers in fact received more
information than they reported receiving. Id. 219-21. Cf. Day, Assessing the Effects
of Information Disclosure Requirements, J. MABaKTxIG, April 1976, at 42, 44
(criticizing methodology of studies of the effectiveness of disclosure legislation in
part because these studies relied heavily on self-reporting of behavior).
6 Despite these difficulties, marketing scholars for several years have been
surveying consumers to ascertain the maximum and minimum prices consumers
would pay before they begin shopping, and apparently believe that surveys of this
kind would be useful to firms. See, e.g., Adam, Consumer Reactions To Price, in
PmcING STRATEGY 75 (1969); Fouilhe, The Subjective Evaluation of Price:
Methodological Aspects, id. 89; Gabor & Granger, The Attitude of the Consumer to
Prices, id. 132; Monroe, Buyers' Subjective Perceptions of Price, 10 J. MA=T
RESEAR H 70 (1973); Monroe, Measuring Price Thresholds by Psychophysics and
Latitudes of Acceptance, 8 J. MARKET lEsEAncn 460 (1971); Stoetzel, Psychological/SociologicalAspects of Price, in PncsuG ST AEGY, supra, at 70.
50 See text accompanying notes 69-82 infra.
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don germane, but experience there teaches that the question is
difficult. To summarize, inexpensively obtained and precise answers to the question whether the existence of imperfect information has caused given markets to behave noncompetitively will
seldom be available in real cases.
The illustration of how a hypothetical decisionmaker could
apply the mixed strategy model nevertheless demonstrates that
markets are likely to behave much better in the face of imperfect
information than is commonly supposed. Under relatively plausible assumptions respecting costs and consumer preferences, the illustration showed that a market may behave competitively if as many
as two thirds of the consumers in it know only the prices they themselves pay; if fewer consumers than these are informed, the same
assumptions would support a conclusion that many firms are still
charging the competitive price. Thus, the fixed sample size model,
as well as the sequential search models discussed earlier, suggest
that decisionmakers should be cautious in imposing expensive disclosure requirements and that close cases should be resolved against
intervention.
The analysis in the preceding part 57 and the illustration just
set forth are also useful to actual decisionmakers because they suggest that certain elements are more consistent with the presence of
competitive behavior than with its absence. These elements are:
(a) If prices cluster, a market is likely to be at a competitive or
a monopolistic equilibrium. A price cluster accompanied by
the presence of a substantial number of comparison shoppers
(for example, one third or more 58 of total consumers in that
market if firms' costs and mark-ups, and consumers' sample
limit prices are at least roughly as supposed above) is more consistent with the former outcome.
(b) A price cluster with a few prices above it is also more consistent with a competitive outcome than a monopoly outcome.
(c) If price advertising is common, a market is unlikely to be
at a monopoly equilibrium; the "best case" for intervention
cannot be made. This conclusion is suggested by the conventional sequential search models discussed above."" To illustrate
the point, assume that: (1) prices cluster around the monopoly
57

See text accompanying notes 22-52 supra.

58

See text accompanying note 52 supra.

59 See text following note 39 supra.
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price, (2) advertising is common, and (3) consumers often observe two or more ads. In these circumstances, a firm could
increase profits by cutting its price and advertising the cut.
Because the firm was already advertising, the marginal cost of
communicating information about the price cut would be small;
because some consumers would observe the contrast between
this price and others, the firm's business would increase. The
monopoly price thus would not be an equilibrium. The fixed
sample size model also implies that the presence of price advertising correlates positively with the absence of a monopoly
equilibrium, since such advertising reduces the costs of comparison shopping.
(d) If comparison shopping is convenient, the likelihood that
a competitive equilibrium will exist is enhanced. The costs of
such shopping vary inversely with the costs of making comparisons. These latter costs will be lower if the methods of quoting
prices or commonly used terms are standardized, because it is
easier to compare like things and because consumers can use
the knowledge obtained about prices and terms in one transaction conveniently to understand others. Thus, if prices and
terms in a market are quoted in standard and relatively clear
fashion, the market, other things equal, is more likely than not
to be competitive.
(e) As is implicit in the foregoing analysis, and as the next
section of the Article 00 will make clear, competition is more
likely when sellers cannot conveniently discriminate among
consumers on the basis of relative knowledge or sophistication.
Given the above, a decisionmaker observing a market in which
price advertising is common, prices cluster, comparison shopping
seems common and relatively inexpensive, and firm discrimination
among consumers is quite difficult to practice, should conclude that
no information problems exist.
An illustrative application of these criteria may be drawn from
one of the few markets for which data is available-the market for
financing consumer purchases of new cars. A 1971 state-by-state
survey of finance charges revealed that the median range between
the lowest and highest annual percentage rates (APR) quoted for
financing cars varied from two percent in the lowest variance state
to seven percent in the highest variance state, with five percent the
60 See text accompanying notes 69-82 infra.
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most common figure., 1 A more recent but less extensive survey
62
suggested that the two percent range is becoming more common.
Thus, prices cluster in this market. Moreover, an appreciable
number of consumers apparently do search. Another study reported
that of the consumers who purchased cars and household durables
on credit because they lacked the resources to make cash purchases,
thirty percent and twenty percent, respectively, consulted alternative
credit sources. 3 Because this measure did not consider search
within source types-how many banks visited-the authors suggest
that the report "may have significantly underestimated the amount
of search." " Further, prices are quoted in a fashion that facilitates
comparisons-the APR.
With respect to other criteria, price advertising in local markets
does not seem uncommon, and although there are sometimes allegations of discrimination, 5 consumer finance markets generally appear to segment along risk lines. 60 All of this suggests, in the absence of hard data to the contrary, that the auto loan market is
presently competitive with respect to price, and that regulations
such as usury laws are unnecessary. It must be admitted that this
method of analysis is plainly rough, but it is focused on the right
issue-how markets behave. Moreover, it is grounded in rigorous
theory; it is easily as precise as inquiries currently conducted in
61 Schober & Shay, State and Regional Estimates of the Price and Volume of
the Major Types of Consumer Instalment Credit in Mid-1971, in NA.ONAL CoMisiSSON ON CONSUmER FINANCE, 3 TECHNC.AL STuDiEs pt. 1, at 99-103, 123 (1972).
62See How to Save on a Car Loan, 43 CONSUME REP. 201, 202 (1978)
(survey by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System of the "most
common" annual percentage rates charged by the largest banks in the cities sampled;
lower rates may have been available from smaller banks).
63Day & Brandt, A Study of Consumer Credit Decisions: Implications for
Present and Prospective Legislation, in NATIONAL COMMSION ON CONSUMER
FInANCE, 1 TECHNICAL. STuiEs pt. 2, at 41 (1972).
64 Id. 67 (footnote omitted).
0 The allegations prompted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691-1691f (1976), which outlaws discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or because any part of the applicant's
income derives from a public assistance program.
66Consumer finance companies have considerably higher costs and charge
higher rates than do banks. See Benston, Risk on Consumer Finance Company
Personal Loans, 32 J. FINANCE 593 (1977); Benston, Rate Ceiling Implications of
the Cost Structure of Consumer Finance Companies, 32 J. FINANcE 1169 (1977).
This market segmentation could occur only if the finance companies and banks lend
to different customers, and it seems common understanding in the field that the
former deal with higher risk debtors than the later. But cf. White & Munger,
Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of New Car Buyers and
Auto Loans, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 1207 (1971) (some consumers who borrowed from
banks dealing with high-risk debtors could have borrowed from banks dealing with
low-risk debtors).
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similar fields, such as antitrust; W and as our understanding of how
markets behave under conditions of imperfect information deepens,
it can be made more precise still.8
IV. DECIDING WHEN TO INTERVENE UNDER RELAXED ASSUMPTIONS:
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Search equilibrium models make two relatively strong (i.e., un-

realistic) assumptions: (1) goods are homogeneous; and (2) firms do
not discriminate among consumers on the basis of knowledge or
sophistication. This section discusses the implications of relaxing
these assumptions for the decision to intervene.
A. Quality and Term Heterogeneity
There is a common taxonomy of product heterogeneity:
products are either "search" or "experience" goods.6 9 A search
67

1n

adjudicating the legality of a merger between two firms in the same line

of business when the acquiring firm was not in the acquired firm's market, the
Supreme Court stated:
[T~he Court has recognized that a market extension merger may be unlawful if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring
firm has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render
it a perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm's premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempered
oligopolistic behavior on the part of existing participants in that market.
In other words, the Court has interpreted § 7 [of the Clayton Act] as encompassing what is commonly known as the "wings effect"-the probability that the acquiring firm prompted premerger procompetitive effects
within the target market by being perceived by the existing firms in that
market as likely to enter de novo.
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1974). See
generally United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-504 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531-37 (1973). These
inquiries are at least as complex and expensive to conduct as those we propose, and
they seem less susceptible of precise answers; our criteria focus on observable facts
such as market prices and the extent of comparison shopping rather than on such
intangible factors as whether a firm would have entered a market or whether the
possibility of entry "tempered" noncompetitive behavior by existing firms.
68 The analysis above, it may be added, helps explain why decisionmakers may
intelligently worry less about the competitive state of business markets than of consumer markets. Many firms have buying specialists whose job is to shop for the
firm. Because greater search correlates positively with increased competitive behavior, many business markets may be acceptably competitive. Finally, because
legislatures cannot conveniently ascertain the competitive state of particular markets
before passing statutes, an institutional implication of the argument that an intervention should not be made unless a market's competitive state is explored is that
state responses to the problem of noncompetitive behavior resulting from imperfect
information should primarily be administrative or judicial. The antitrust laws,
which seek to ascertain and remedy noncompetitive behavior resulting from structural market imperfections or collusive behavior, afford a convenient analogy. For
reasons developed below, see text accompanying notes 89-114 infra, we argue that
process is best suited to respond to information problems.
the administrative
6
9This taxonomy was initially used in Nelson, Information and Consumer
Behavior, 78 J. FozrrrcAL EcoN. 311 (1970). For a table stating goods that fall
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-good is one whose salient characteristics the consumer can learn
before purchase, by direct observation; an experience good is one
whose salient characteristics can only be learned after purchase, by
actual use. Price and terms, in this lexicon, are search characteristics because the consumer can learn of them before buying, while
some aspects of performance-for example, automobile seat comfort
during a long drive-are experience characteristics because they can
be learned only through use.
1. Search Goods Generally
In principle, the fixed sample size model applies to markets of
heterogeneous search goods because such markets are usually divisible
into roughly homogeneous subsets. Consider, for example, a radio
sold in two- and three-knob versions. Whether each version is
priced competitively is again largely a function of the ratio of comparison shoppers to total shoppers for that version. Goods can
differ along several quality dimensions, however. The two-knob
version thus may be more durable but less precise than the threeknob version. If products nevertheless segment into classes recognizable both to consumers and firms, and if consumers shop primarily within quality classes, the effect of imperfect information on
the state of competition in each class can be examined in the rough
manner we have described. Products often do segment in this way:
beers are premium or ordinary, wines are estate bottled or commune, and cars are compact or full size. Moreover, consumers do
seem to search primarily within quality classes.70 In markets of
heterogeneous search goods, therefore, investigations of the state of
'competition would be more costly and less exact than in markets in
which homogeneity prevails, but the criteria developed above would
nevertheless be helpful.
2. Contract Terms
The discussion to this point has implicitly assumed that a
market (or market subset) in which price is competitive is also cominto the two categories, see id. 319. A third category, usually applied to services,
is "credence." A credence quality cannot be evaluated by direct observation or
use. As an illustration, a consumer may never know whether the automobile repair
he purchased was actually necessary. See Darby & Karni, Free Competition and
-the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 68-69 (1973). No search
equilibrium models consider credence qualities.
70 Udell reports that 73% of the purchasers of small appliances stated that they
planned their decision prior to shopping in a store, which suggests that consumers
comparison shop within quality levels. Udell, supra note 46, at 52. If a majority
of consumers comparison shop across quality levels, market price distributions for
,some goods may be too ambiguous to evaluate.
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petitive with respect to purchase terms. This assumption may be
too strong. Suppose that all firms insert in their sales contracts a
particular term-such as an acceleration clause 71-which can impose
substantial costs on consumers. Suppose also that the firms conceal
this term by using fine print and complex legal language. In these
circumstances, the true price to consumers exceeds the nominal
purchase price, but they may respond only to this latter price. If
enough consumers comparison shop, the market would reach equilibrium at the nominal competitive price. Consumers, however,
would suffer a welfare loss; they would be paying a higher true
price than they would have paid if the existence and significance
of the clause at issue were disclosed, for the nominal competitive
price does not reflect the costs the term shifted to consumers.
This problem has been neglected until this point because it
has been assumed that when a sufficient number of consumers comparison shop to generate a competitive price equilibrium, enough
of these consumers would be term conscious to prevent the market
from reaching a monopoly equilibrium with respect to important
terms. Put another way, if enough consumers comparison shop to
make it profitable for firms to compete on price and quality, firms
also are likely to compete on terms. This justification for equating
terms with prices is of course unavailing if a particular market is
not at a competitive equilibrium with respect to price. In such
circumstances, however, intervening to produce enough comparison
shopping so that a competitive price equilibrium will occur should
resolve the term problem.
Nevertheless, the equation of term competition with price competition is not completely satisfactory because the overlap between
consumers conscious of price and quality and those conscious of
terms may be imperfect. This lack of correspondence may result
from differences in consumer competence, taste (some persons simply dislike learning about their contracts), or from differences in
cost. Evaluating terms is more costly than evaluating prices or
search characteristics such as color, size or fit; some comparison
71 The courts have split on the question whether the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1976), requires disclosure of acceleration clauses. For a discussion of the cases, see Comment, Acceleration Clause Disclosure Under The Truth
In Lending Law, 77 CoLum. L. Rav. 649 (1977) (concluding that disclosure is
probably not required under current law, but that the statute should be amended to
require it because "a right of acceleration is of significance to the borrower." Id.
668). See also Note, Acceleration Clause Disclosure: A Truth in Lending Policy
Analysis, 53 In. L.J. 97 (1977) (using economic analysis to suggest that the Truth
in Lending Act should require disclosure of acceleration clauses to promote comparative shopping, encourage informed consumer decisions, increase consumer awareness, and improve the allocation of resources).
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shoppers in consequence may devote little time to examining terms.
Further, in the absence of formal analysis it cannot be said that
term competition occurs in precisely the same way as price competition.
These difficulties suggest that additional criteria are required
to guide the decision to intervene when terms are at issue. A
monopoly equilibrium provides the best case for an intervention;
it occurs when firms do not compete to give consumers better terms,
but instead are aware of consumer ignorance and actively exploit
it to procure for the firms themselves the most favorable terms possible given consumers' tastes, resources and alternative opportunities.7 2
A market can be considered monopolistic 73 for any term used
by all or almost all firms if: (1) the market is not price competitive;
and (2) the term at issue appears in arcane legal language and fine
or otherwise inconspicuous print. It is more costly for consumers
to search for terms than for prices or some aspects of quality; if too
few price searchers exist to generate a competitive or almost competitive price structure, too few term searchers may exist to generate
a nonmonopolistic term structure. If the market is price competitive but the second criterion is met, a monopolistic outcome for any
term should be presumed to occur if a substantial portion (more
than one third 74 if the market is roughly similar to the electric
clothes dryer market discussed above) of the comparison shoppers
are not term conscious. Basing a finding of monopoly on a much
lower percentage of uninformed consumers than this may lead to
serious errors because it seems unlikely that markets that are com72 By contrast, a competitive equilibrium is one in which, given existing technology, costs, and consumer tastes, the market generates a mix of terms that maximizes social welfare rather than the welfare of firms. In such a case, it should be
noted, firms will not necessarily provide the same terms to all consumers. This is
largely because consumers differ in their degree of risk aversion and time preference
(for example, some consumers may prefer to buy disposable sports cars over safer,
more economic vehicles with longer-term warranties).
73 We have phrased the issue as whether a market is monopolistic respecting
terms because administrative difficulties will probably prevent decisionmakers from
evaluating term equilibria intermediate between competition and monopoly. It
would be extraordinarily difficult (perhaps impossible) to compute the welfare loss
of such equilibria, as contrasted with a competitive equilibrium respecting the
purchase terms at issue. Also, present economic models are unable to characterize
intermediate equilibria with respect to terms. Thus when terms are at issue, a
decisionmaker should intervene (cost of intervention problems aside) only when a
monopoly outcome occurs. For an attempt to characterize the welfare effects of
imperfect information when price is the only independent variable and the setting
is otherwise somewhat artificial (the government controls all the prices), see

Diamond, Welfare Analysis of Imperfect Information Equilibria, 9 Bm.
82 (1978).
74 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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petitive with respect to price will be monopolistic with respect to
terms unless significant numbers of consumers are not term conscious.
3. Experience Goods
Search equilibrium models assume that consumers can evaluate
all relevant aspects of a product before purchase; the equilibria these
models characterize relate to known characteristics, particularly to
price. Because consumers cannot evaluate experience characteristics before purchase, the models appear to say little about markets
for experience goods. This, however, understates the utility of the
analysis. Markets for some experience goods behave as if they were
markets for search goods, and the markets for many other experience
goods are unlikely to work in fundamentally different ways.
Generally, experience goods can be distinguished by frequency
of purchase. A consumer who wishes to buy milk, for example, can
become familiar with the experience aspects of different brands,
such as taste and texture, in less than a week. Therefore, after a
few initial purchases frequently purchased experience goods are essentially equivalent to search goods in that consumers know, or can
quickly learn, all aspects of quality before making further purchases. Decisionmakers can therefore ascertain the competitive
state of such markets in the same fashion they use to evaluate search
good markets.

75

Current search equilibrium models, however, are at best suggestive of the conditions associated with competitive equilibria in
markets for infrequently purchased experience goods. Such equilibria are likely to be largely functions of the ratio of knowledgeable consumers to total consumers in a market; probably an appropriate way for the state to facilitate their occurrence is to reduce the
costs of comparison shopping. Until the understanding of experience goods advances, however, search equilibrium models will shed
relatively little light on the question when intervention in experience goods markets on the basis of imperfect information is justified.
B. DiscriminationAmong Consumers
The mixed strategy model presented above7 assumed that each
firm charged the same price and provided the same quality to all of
its customers.7 7 When firms competed for the business of compari7r See text following note 51 supra through text accompanying note 68 supra.
76 See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
77 See text following note 48 supra.
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son shoppers, nonsearchers necessarily were benefited. But if firms
discriminate among customers on the basis of knowledge or sophistication, this pecuniary externality would vanish; firms would exploit nonsearchers by charging them higher prices or providing
them with lower quality products and services than would be offered to comparison shoppers. It is useful, in discussing this possibility, to distinguish between "mass" and "individualized" transactions. In the former, firms cannot conveniently learn the
characteristics of individual consumers. The efficiencies of mass
transactions lie in the existence of a very high ratio of customers to
sales persons and in such transactions being conducted rapidly.
Retail sales of relatively low-priced items afford the best illustration.
"Individualized" transactions are characterized by considerable personal contact between firm representatives and customers and commonly involve bargaining over price and product features. The
paradigm is the sale of a new car.
1. Mass Transactions
In mass transactions, discrimination by individual firms among
their customers seldom occurs because firms cannot conveniently
obtain the information to engage in such practices. To explain how
this information gap precludes discrimination, it will initially be
shown that although markets may segment by quality level, individual firms will sell products at prices that accurately reflect their
quality differences. Let consumers be divided into two classes,
sophisticated (class "A") and unsophisticated (class "B"). A sophisticated consumer can discern a difference in quality between two
seemingly identical products. Assume that the two versions of the
product are sold in the market, high quality ("X") and low quality
("Y"); both appear identical to the ignorant eye. Firms purchase
these versions at prices that reflect their quality attributes. If firms
could distinguish sophisticated class A consumers from unsophisticated class B consumers they could sell high quality X goods to the
former and low quality Y goods to the latter for the same price.
This would maximize profits because Y goods cost firms less than X
goods.
Sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, however, look
very much alike; in mass transactions the costs to firms of examining
consumers to ascertain into which class they fall would exceed the
gains. In these circumstances, an apparently profitable strategy
would be for firms to let consumers sort themselves out by their
purchases. Each firm could put a mix of X and Y goods on the
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shelf so that class A consumers would buy the former and class B
consumers the latter.
Such a strategy would fail if an appreciable number of sophisticated consumers existed, because unsophisticated consumers sometimes would luckily purchase X goods. The A consumers would
only buy these goods, but B consumers would buy both X and Y
goods because they cannot distinguish between them. Thus, each
firm would have to set out more X goods than it has A customers;
otherwise its B customers would purchase some of the goods intended for the A customers, thereby causing these persons to switch
to other firms. Setting out somewhat more X goods than there are
A customers, however, would create an unstable situation. The
higher the ratio of X goods to Y goods the more often B customers
would purchase X goods. Thus each firm would face a constant
pressure to increase the ratio of X goods to Y goods.
A numerical example illustrates how this pressure would work.
Suppose a firm has 100 customers, half of which are sophisticated A's
and half unsophisticated B's. The firm initially stocks 100 widgets,
fifty of which are X and fifty Y. The demand for good widgets
(Dx) is fifty (by A's) plus twenty-five (by B's). All A's of course
demand X widgets. But B's demand twenty-five X widgets because
if a B consumer cannot distinguish X's from Y's and fifty percent
X's and fifty percent Y's are present, the B consumer will choose an
X widget fifty percent of the time. Thus, in this example the firm
sets out fifty X widgets but has a demand for seventy-five X widgets.
Let the firm next set out seventy-five X widgets and twenty-five Y
widgets. Dx = 50 (by A's) + 36.5 (by B's). Once again, if there
are seventy-five percent good widgets, unsophisticated consumers
will choose a good widget seventy-five percent of the time. Although there now are twenty-five more X widgets than A customers,
the demand for X widgets has risen from 75 to 86.5. Again, the
firm is understocked. A likely result of this situation is firm specialization by quality level, with some firms selling only X goods and
others only Y goods, at different prices. The class into which a
particular firm would fall would be determined by the percentage
of knowledgeable customers it has, the market price, and the cost
difference to the firm of purchasing superior and inferior versions
of the product.
As a consequence of specialization, decisionmakers could examine the effect of imperfect information on the prices of X and Y
goods in the fashion we have previously described. 78 Thus, the
78 See text following note 77 supra.
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possibility of discrimination in quality levels does not add very much
additional complexity to the already complicated analysis of mass
transaction markets characterized by imperfect information.
This analysis also shows that individual firms generally would
not discriminate among customers by price or terms. Let class A
consumers be comparison shoppers and class B consumers be persons
who only visit one firm. Because firms cannot distinguish in this
respect among consumers, or segment consumers by setting out
varying contract packages, they will offer each consumer the same
contract package. In transactions commonly recognized as mass,
moreover, each firm commonly does sell goods or services at the
same price and under the same terms to all customers.7 9 Whether
this is a competitive package depends upon the ratio of comparison
shoppers to total shoppers in the market.8 0
2. Individualized Transactions
In individualized transactions, in which firm representatives
spend a relatively large amount of time with customers and in consequence can get to know them, firms apparently can discriminate
in price and quality without incurring excessive costs. Ascertaining the existence of such discrimination, however, would be very
difficult, largely because of the prohibitive cost of establishing actual
transaction prices or quality differences among goods sold at similar
prices. Thus the question for decisionmakers apparently is whether
particular circumstances make discrimination likely. Once more,
the probability of discrimination appears largely to be a function
of the ratio of knowledgeable consumers to total consumers in a
given market. The more consumers who are knowledgeable about
the price and quality differences among new cars, for example, the
lower the inducement to a dealer to invest resources in ascertaining
and acting upon differences in consumer awareness levels, even
though here the circumstances more readily permit such activities.
In markets in which discrimination is possible-for example,
cars and expensive stereo equipment-some consumers, perhaps because they are aware of the difficulty of ascertaining quality, are
willing to purchase information that classifies products by performance and price. In consequence, periodicals devoted exclu79 Some corroboration of the model lies in studies that indicate that individual
retailers do not discriminate among consumers on the basis of income or ethnic
characteristics, both of which are commonly used as proxies for being uninformed
or unsophisticated. See J. ENGEL, D. KOLLAT & R. BLAcxwELL, supra note 48, at
187.
so See text accompanying note 52 supra.

666

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 127:630

sively or partially to rating cars and stereos are quite common.8 '
The large amount of available information in these markets, in comparison to many other markets, suggests that the ratio of knowledgeable consumers to total consumers of cars and stereos may be high
enough so that discrimination is not a serious problem. The very
sparse and inconclusive empirical evidence is also consistent with
2
this perception.
Nevertheless, discrimination is a potentially serious concern.
Search equilibrium models shed relatively little light on the question when discrimination is being practiced and what remedies are
appropriate. Further, the remedy question raises issues that are
beyond the scope of this Article. As an illustration, a way to prevent price discrimination in particular markets is to require firms
to charge all consumers the same price. Whether the welfare gains
such a policy would confer on unsophisticated consumers would
exceed the welfare losses to sophisticated consumers and firms as
well as the costs of enforcing the policy is an issue we make no attempt to resolve here. Thus, the analysis of this Article should not
be taken to apply to individualized transactions, except insofar as
it suggests that discrimination in such transactions does not now
seem to be a serious problem.
V.

NORMATIVE ISSUES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. Normative Issues
Once it has been found that a market is behaving noncompetitively because too few consumers are informed, the initial choice a
81
82

E.g., C"n & DnrVE,

MOTOR Tnmsm, HIGH FmErrv, STEmo REVIEW.

An empirical study that sent researchers disguised as potential buyers to
new car dealers found no statistically significant differences between the prices
quoted to black and white buyers, but did find such differences between the prices
quoted to "poorly dressed" and other buyers. These differences seemed small
although they were statistically significant. A poorly dressed black male received
price quotes on new cars the mean of which was $3,836.18 while a well-dressed
black male received quotes the mean of which was $3,754.14, a difference of $82.04.
Wise, Differential Pricing and Treatment by New-Car Salesmen: The Effect of the
Prospect's Race, Sex and Dress, 47 J. Bus. 218 (1974). See also Wise, Cox & Floto,
Sex and Race Discrimination in the New-Car Showroom: A Fact or Myth?, 11
J. CoNsuisR AFF. 107 (Winter 1977) (suggesting that salesmen seem to discriminate with respect to price according to the sex and race of applicants, but that
personality factors could have slanted the data). Dealers, it should be noted, do
not discriminate among consumers on the basis of contract terms, nor can they
seriously discriminate on the basis of quality. Cf. Leff, Contract As Thing, 19
Am. U. L. REv. 131, 145-47 (1970) (observing that the sometimes extensive bargaining between consumers and automobile dealers did not concern the contract of
sale).
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decisionmaker faces is whether to regulate the substantive transaction or to attempt to move the market toward a competitive equilibrium. We shall assume that regulation would involve ordering
firms to reduce monopoly prices s3 or to excise monopoly terms
from service or purchase contracts. Moving a market toward a
competitive equilibrium is preferable to such regulation, assuming
all other things equal, for three reasons. First, regulation is unlikely to be effective because firms can exploit in numerous ways
the bargaining power that the lack of comparison shoppers confers
on them. As an example, if a court banned the use of a particular
term, firms could preserve their monopoly power by switching to
other terms that also shift costs to consumers. This strategy would
probably be effective, because if too few consumers comparison
shopped to generate a nonmonopolistic equilibrium respecting the
term initially used in their contracts, it is unlikely that enough
consumers would comparison shop to ensure a nonmonopolistic
equilibrium for the substitute terms.
A second ground for eschewing regulation is that, if consumers
could conveniently be informed, regulation would limit choices in a
non-optimal fashion. Banning harsh terms forces consumers who
prefer to accept these terms in order to take advantage of lower
prices to pay higher ones. Conversely, a limit on prices would
requires consumers who knowingly prefer to pay higher prices to
take harsh terms instead." Put another way, regulation prevents
consumers from making informed decisions between contract terms
and prices.
Finally, seeming monopoly equilibria are sometimes unstable.
For example, the standard automobile warranty in use in the late
1950's always appeared in arcane legal language and fine print;
apparently neither firms nor other institutions informed consumers
of the nature of the risks they were bearing. The industry, however, began to compete extensively on warranty coverage in the
1960's, and continues to compete in this area today.s5 If the state
33 Cf. American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d
886 (1964) (refusing to enforce the full contract price on the ground that it was
unconscionably high); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d
264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (same); UsNoM CONSUTMM CREDrr CODE § 5.108(4)(c)
(providing that a "factor" supporting a finding of unconscionability is "gross disparity between the price . . . and the value of the property . . . measured by the
price at which similar property ... [is] readily obtainable ... by like consumers").
84 See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1057-59.

85 See Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power And The Judicial Process,
49 IND. L.J. 367, 385 n.41 (1974).
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had intervened to specify acceptable terms for automobile warranties, this competitive behavior might never have emerged.8 6
For these reasons, the preferable state response when imperfect information has caused a market to behave noncompetitively is
to move the market toward a competitive equilibrium. One method
of achieving this goal is to reduce the costs of comparison shopping
to consumers. Before discussing this method, however, it will be
useful to reevaluate a crucial premise of the above analysis. It has
been argued so far that an intervention that would reduce the costs
to consumers of becoming informed-termed here "required disclosure"-is not justified if the market in question is competitive.
Such an intervention, we assume, is unnecessary because a property
of competitive markets is to generate prices and terms that are
utility maximizing for all consumers. An efficiency argument and
two fairness arguments nevertheless might be made to justify required disclosure in competitive markets.
The basic premise of the efficiency argument is that the state
can reduce the costs of comparison shopping (for example, by requiring firms to quote prices in standard fashion) even in competitive markets. Such an intervention would raise each firm's average
cost curve and in consequence would require all consumers to pay
higher prices. All consumers would lose because of the increased
prices. For nonshoppers this loss would not be offset by any gain,
but comparison shoppers would benefit from the reduction in search
costs generated by the required price disclosure. If the net gain to
comparison shoppers (reduced search costs minus higher prices)
would exceed the losses to nonshoppers plus the costs of administering the law, the intervention would be optimal.
It would be almost impossible, however, for an actual decisionmaker to make this utility calculation, largely because the relevant
facts would be too expensive to collect. Further, no theoretical
reason exists to believe that required disclosure in competitive markets would often produce net welfare gains. If one were to speculate about the facts, such an outcome seems unlikely given the
expense of administering disclosure legislation. Therefore, it seems
wiser to limit efficiency-motivated interventions to the case of noncompetitive markets.
A fairness argument that required disclosure should be imposed in competitive markets stems from the premise that persons
86

These three reasons would also militate against requiring firms to substitute

gentle clauses for harsh ones.

The Magnuson-Moss Act, however, does engage in

regulation, as it provides that firms cannot disclaim implied warranties if they make

written express warranties.

15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976).
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should be relieved of the chore of shopping; thus an intervention
that reduces search costs is desirable by virtue of this effect alone.
Although such an intervention would increase the leisure time of
shoppers, it would also impose costs upon nonshoppers and the state.
Consequently, this justification for required disclosure is unpersuasive unless a further argument exists to justify conferring a benefit on shoppers at the expense of other consumers. The only
relevant argument is that comparison shoppers generated the competitive equilibrium, which benefited all consumers, and thus deserve compensation. But this case for compensation dissolves under
analysis. The proposal cannot be justified on the ground that it
87 Comwould encourage shoppers to take socially desirable actions.
parison shoppers are already performing a socially useful function
by helping to maintain a competitive market; thus it is unnecessary
to provide them with additional incentives by reducing their search
costs. A second possible ground for increasing the wealth of comparison shoppers is that they are worthier than nonshoppers. But
it is difficult to perceive the basis for this claim. Such persons shop
because the private gains to them from shopping exceed the costs.
No prevalent ethical scheme justifies making them better off at the
expense of society as a whole because they act in accordance with
this motive, and no other indicia of greater worthiness appear germane. Thus, this fairness argument-that shopping is a burden that
the state should always attempt to lighten-must be rejected.
A somewhat more persuasive argument is that disclosure legislation increases the opportunity for consumers to participate in
market transactions, and in consequence makes those transactions
seem fair. Some consumers, according to this argument, may realize
that they are agreeing to contracts under conditions of imperfect
information because they find the costs of becoming informed to
be prohibitive. If these consumers later become dissatisfied with
their deals, they may not agree that a competitive market protected
them against overreaching by firms; they may instead say that the
choices of those of their fellow citizens who comparison shopped
are not as good a guarantor of fair terms as their own informed
choices would have been. This claim of unfairness would be much
less tenable, however, if the state had taken obvious steps to ensure
that the relevant information was readily available. In such circumstances, every consumer would (or should) realize that society
had seriously attempted to increase the opportunity of consumers to
8

7See generally Daniels, Merit and Meritocracy, 7 Pim.osopiy & PuB. AFF.

206 (1978).
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affect their own transactions. Because it is important that persons
have faith in the fairness of social institutions, the state should
therefore make obvious efforts to increase market participation by
reducing search costs in all markets, not just noncompetitive ones. ss
Although this fairness argument has some merit, it cannot support required disclosure in competitive markets. The claim is no
more compelling than a corollary fairness claim of the comparison
shoppers. A market may be competitive because a substantial number of consumers found it convenient to inform themselves. If this
is so, these informed consumers might object that they should not
be compelled to pay the higher prices resulting from disclosure requirements simply because other consumers who chose to consume
leisure or engage in work rather than search subsequently repented
their decision. The fairness claim of the shoppers seems as compelling as the claim of the nonshoppers. Given these conflicting
interests, the administrative costs of required disclosure militate
strongly against intervention. In addition, the nonsearchers' fairness claim often may be dissipated by debate; these consumers may
be persuaded to change their views when they become aware of the
ratio of costs to gains commonly generated by interventions in competitive markets. Finally, this fairness argument justifies interventions only when consumer dissatisfaction is widespread and apparent;
such action is too costly to justify intervention on the presumption
that many consumers believe the market game to be unfair.
A variant of the argument that reducing search costs makes
consumer transactions seem fair is that required disclosure increases
the apparent fairness of these transactions to all consumers, although
88 This fairness claim seems analogous to the claim that a person has a procedural right to a hearing to contest a disadvantageous action even though the
person lacks an entitlement or a substantive right that a hearing could protect. The
right to a hearing arises because the persons affected by the unfavorable action are
entitled to at least an explanation of the reasons for the actions that have adversely
affected them and a chance to participate in the decisionmaking process. This
"procedural" entitlement is based upon membership of decisionmakers and affected
persons in the same community. See Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in
ProceduralDue Process, in 18 NoMos 126 (1977). Similarly, it may be claimed that
a person has a right to have search costs reduced in competitive markets, not because
one has a right to a particular market outcome, but because all members of a community are entitled to be informed of and participate in decisions to take actions that
affect them (here, the process of comparison shopping) and reducing search costs
conduces to this end. In addition to the difficulties with this position, which the
text next discusses, we add that it is a difficult position to confine. All persons have
a formal right to participate in the market (e.g., the nonsearchers could search) and
many actions could make that right more real, such as redistributing wealth to give
some groups a greater say in market outcomes. The position that "extra formal"
rights to participate should be created does not shed very much light on which such
rights the state should enact into law. In any event, we have no reason to assume
that Professor Michelman would extend his analysis to the market context.
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some consumers actually may not act on the information. Two objections to intervening in markets on this ground exist. First, the
justification yields no criteria by which to decide how fair a consumer transaction should appear. Thus decisionmakers cannot know
when a particular intervention is necessary or how much new disclosure is required. Second, this justification may be unnecessary; if
consumers become more satisfied with purchases when they receive
more information concerning prices and contract terms, even though
this information may not be used, accompanying price and term
information is actually another product feature. Firms thus now
have an incentive to supply it, just as they supply other sales enhancing product features such as color varieties. In consequence,
markets may already be generating the optimal amount of information necessary to ensure apparent fairness. For all of the reasons
given here, then, this paper's premise that disclosure should be required only in noncompetitive markets seems valid.
B. Policy Recommendations
1. Removing Legal Restraints
Before discussing affirmative steps to render the behavior of
markets more competitive, it is useful to consider the possibility
of the removal of legal barriers that may prevent the attainment of
competitive equilibria. Three methods of pursuing a strategy
of permitting markets to function without interference seem promising. First, restrictions on nonfraudulent advertising should be
removed.8 9 The models described in part II of this Article indicate
that advertising is useful in preventing the existence of monopolistic
89
The Supreme Court has held that advertising of prices in some circumstances
is protected by the first amendment. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975). Nevertheless, advertising is often regulated. As an example, the
Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (1976), prohibits advertising the
prices of leases unless the ads are accompanied by the disclosure of much additional
sales information, such as methods of determining a lessee's liability at the end of
the term and whether or not the lessee has an option to purchase (and the price
and time of exercise of any such option). Id. § 1667(c). This regulation raises the
cost of price advertising. Also, lawyer advertising remains heavily regulated despite
the Supreme Court's holdings. See Muris & McChesney, Advertising and the Price
and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, Working Paper, Law and
Economics Center, University of Miami School of Law (1978) (copy on file at the

University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Finally, the Supreme Court recently
upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting optometrists from using trade
names in connection with optometrical practice. Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S. Ct.
887 (1979). Because the use of trade names can reduce consumer search costs and
facilitate comparison shopping, the Friedman decision narrows the constitutional protection for advertising that facilitates competitive outcomes.
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equilibria and in moving markets toward competitive equilibria.
This result is consistent with, and helps explain, evidence that prices
are higher when advertising is prohibited. 90 Thus, prohibitions or
restrictions on the advertising of the prices and contract terms of
particular goods or services, or restrictions on advertising in particular media, can reduce consumer welfare in that they may cause
consumers to pay higher prices.
Similarly, courts should not regard a seller's use of a standard
form contract as a factor militating against enforcement of the contract if its method of quoting the terms at issue is similar to the
methods commonly used in the relevant market for quoting terms
of this kind. The mixed strategy model "I showed that a market
is more likely to behave competitively if many consumers comparison shopped and if comparison shoppers visited a relatively large
number of stores. We have also seen that if firms standardize the
way in which prices and terms are quoted, the cost of comparison
shopping is lessened. If a firm's chances of enforcing its contracts
are reduced because those contracts are standardized, however, the
costs of private, voluntary standardization will rise; consequently,
firms would employ standardized contracts less frequently. Therefore, that a particular contract is cast in standard form should not
militate against enforcing it.92
Finally, the government should consider relaxing the antitrust
laws to permit more voluntary standardization of the format in
which contract prices and terms are quoted. It is commonly said
that the threat of antitrust prosecution inhibits such private standardization; 93 because standardization increases the likelihood of
markets behaving competitively, this threat should be eliminated.
This is not to say that the government should benignly view agreements by firms to fix uniformly the substantive aspects of their
transactions, but only to suggest the social desirability of agreements
to use a common format to set out in standard fashion the terms
9

o See

A. MAuarZi & T.

KELLY,

PICES

BENEF1TS FROM PosTING RETAIL GASOLInE

AND CONSUmER

IqFORmATION;

THE

PmCsS (1978); Benham, The Effect of

Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 337 (1972); Mudis &
McChesney, supra note 89; Steiner, Does Advertising Lower Consumer Prices?,
J. MAPET G, October 1973, at 19 (toys).
9' See text accompanying notes 42-45 and 49 & 50 supra.
92 One author of this Article has recently argued that if consumers are assumed
to have sufficient information, the existence of a standard form contract should be
a neutral factor with respect to the question whether a court should enforce any of
the clauses in it. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1064-71. The argument made
above suggests that the existence of a standard form contract should be neutral with
respect to the enforcement decision even though consumers are assumed to be

imperfectly informed.
9S See L. FuLLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 532 (1972).
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and prices each firm individually chooses to offer. Even so, relaxing
the antitrust laws is a proposal that deserves much more consideration than we give it here. The objection to such a relaxation of the
antitrust laws is that firms may fix prices under the guise of standardizing contracts, or find it easier to police violators of cartel rules. 94
But because standardization is conducive to competitive outcomes,
reducing the costs of standardization should be seriously explored.
2. Affirmative Responses When Markets Are Found to
Behave Noncompetitively
In this section we shall discuss various affirmative measures
designed to shift noncompetitive markets toward competitive equilibria. The analysis is suggestive rather than directive, however,
because the wisdom of a particular legal initiative turns on a comparison of its costs and gains, and these cannot be assessed without
an exploration of the specific contexts in which the initiative will
operate. A decisionmaker, for example, should attempt to compare
the welfare gains an intervention may produce by moving a market
closer to the competitive outcome with both the administrative costs
to the state and the costs to firms of compliance with the new legal
requirement. Interventions may also produce undesirable second
order effects; competition in a particular market, for instance, may
be channelled along those quality or term dimensions firms are
required to disclose. 95 Comparisons of possible welfare gains with
administrative costs, as well as analyses of the likelihood of second
order effects, are beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, the
methods suggested herein to move markets to a competitive outcome
are raised for serious exploration, not asserted as efficacious in all
circumstances.
The most promising method of making markets behave competitively is to provide consumers with comparative price and term
information. If, for example, consumers could cheaply obtain a
list of all prices in a market (or just the lower ones) together with
the identity of the firms charging the prices, the likelihood of obtaining competitive equilibria would be much enhanced. A recent
experiment in which comparative price data were made available
to consumers of certain grocery items tends to corroborate this view.
The study showed that these consumers preferred lower-priced
94

See C.

KAYSEN &

D.

TUNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:

AN EcoNoMiC AND

ANALYsis 150-52, 155 (1959);. F. ScHEnE, supra note .5, at 449, 452.
95 See Day, supra note 54, at 51.
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brands when they were able to compare prices easily.96 Private
firms, however, seldom sell comparative price data, apparently because they could not fully appropriate the value of the information
produced. Once a firm created a price list, it would have great
difficulty preventing other firms and consumers from using the information it revealed without paying for it. For example, a consumer who bought such a list might freely distribute it to his friends.
Consequently, private firms seldom invest in the production of such
information.97 Government agencies, however, could themselves
produce and distribute comparative price data or subsidize firms
98
to do so.
96 Researchers studied the "effectiveness" of legally required unit pricing by
posting next to the supermarket shelf on which particular brands appeared a list
that identified each brand and gave its unit price. Consumers could compare unit
prices more conveniently with such a list than if they were required to make comparisons and computations directly from the labels of products on the shelf. These
price lists were compiled for three relatively homogeneous products (canned dogfood, facial tissue and dishwashing liquid) and posted for three weeks. Consumers
paid from 1.4% less for dogfood to 2.9% less for dishwashing liquid because some of
them switched to less expensive brands. Russo, Krieser & Miyashita, An Effective
Display of Unit Price Information, J. MAI=c=TNG, April 1975, at 11, 17. This
research and our analysis suggest that recent legislation proposed in the House of
Representatives that would require pharmacists to post the prices of commonly used
prescription drugs would be effective in reducing drug prices. See H.R. 10681,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 4591, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Price lists
that saved consumers the trouble of going from firm to firm rather than from one
end of a shelf to the other thus might produce significant reductions in purchase
costs. Providing consumers with lists of commonly used terms (e.g., firm X warrants,
firm Y disclaims) might also improve the efficiency of market outcomes.
97 When firms can exclude "freeloaders" or capture a high portion of the returns
that providing comparative price or term information yields, the market will produce
such information. As an example, a subscription cable television company in Los
Angeles televises comparative grocery prices because it can charge most of the
recipients of this information.
In addition, firms that charge relatively low prices have an incentive to publish
advertisements comparing their prices to those of their competitors, and such advertisements are sometimes seen. A disincentive to advertise in this fashion is that it
can provide free and useful publicity to firms whose prices are close to those of the
advertising firm, for consumers could decide that there is insufficient price dispersion
to warrant searching out the firm that charges the very lowest price. Firms that
engage in comparative price advertising also have incentives to misrepresent the
comparisons, as, for example, by suppressing quality differences. For a discussion
of the legal regulation of comparative advertisements, see Rollins, Comparative Price
Advertising, 33 Bus. LAW. 1771 (1978).
98 A proposed bill to simplify the Truth in Lending Act would authorize the
Federal Reserve board to "collect, publish and disseminate to the public, on a
demonstration basis in a number of standard metropolitan statistical areas to be
determined by the Board, the annual percentage rates charged for representative
types of nonsale credit by creditors in such areas." S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 136(a) (1978).
The Board would also be authorized "to require creditors in
such areas to furnish information necessary for the Board." Id. Although publishing such information is in general an excellent idea, some evidence suggests that
many consumer credit markets may now be sufficiently competitive as not to justify
the expense this statute would entail. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
Thus we would recommend that the Board should not use § 136(a) (assuming the
bill passes) without first ascertaining the state of competition in the markets at issue.
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Three objections to a comparative price information program
are likely to be made, however: (1) such a program could actually
raise prices; (2) consumers would not absorb the information; and
(3) the information would be too expensive to provide. With respect to the first objection, if firms were prevented from charging
prices above those supplied to the listing agency, they might quote
higher prices than they would otherwise charge. This may be because firms anticipate cost increases or merely because of a desire to
preserve flexibility. Both of these motivations could be partly
assuaged by publishing price lists frequently-perhaps once a weekbut the more frequent the list, the more costly the program, and the
more difficult to administer. This objection, however, illustrates
anew the wisdom of attempting to confine interventions to the case
of noncompetitive markets. In such cases, prices are already too
high, and price lists are likely to generate lower (although perhaps
not competitive) prices than would exist in the market if nothing
were done.
The objection that consumers would not absorb data from
comparative price lists stems from the concept of "information
overload" currently in vogue. This concept asserts that when
consumers are provided with too much information they make dysfunctional decisions; the circuits become "overloaded." 99 Recent
experiments, however, fail to support the existence of this phenomenon. The evidence to date shows that more information enables consumers to make better purchase decisions than they would
make were they uninformed, with a "better" purchase decision
defined as one that yields an outcome that more closely approximates a consumer's actual preferences. 100 This is not to say that
99
As an illustration of the popularity of this concept, a governor of the Federal
Reserve Board recently explained to the Senate a Board proposal to simplify the
Truth in Lending Act partly as follows:
Looking at these [commonly used credit] forms, it is hard to avoid the
impression of information overload. There is more information than most
consumers can digest. By reducing the number of items of information
disclosed as under the Board's proposal, the important ones will receive a
greater emphasis and there will be a greater likelihood of affecting consumer behavior.
Proposed Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act: Hearings on S. 1312, S. 1501
and S. 1653 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (July 11, 1977) (Statement
of Philip C. Jackson, Jr., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). See
also Davis, Protecting Consumers From Overdisciosure and Gobbledygook: An
Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv.
841 (1977).
1oo The only serious studies of information overload were doie by Professor
Jacoby. See Jacoby, Speller & Kohn, Brand Choice Behavior' as a Finction of
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the information overload phenomenon never occurs, but instead
that it has not been verified under experimental conditions. Moreover, no one can predict when consumers will experience "overload" in real world situations. Thus, that information overload
may occur if "too much" information is provided is an observation
of little relevance to decisionmakers. To be sure, consumers could
decide that the potential gains from absorbing new information
would exceed the costs. Given the potential savings that the provision of comparative price and term information could yield, however, assertions that such information would not be used are
premature.
The administrative costs of a comparative price information
program could, however, exceed the welfare gains. It would be
expensive to create and maintain price-gathering and promulgating
agencies, to identify the firms and products that should be included
Information Overload, 11 J. MARE BESEARCH 63 (1974); Jacoby, Speller &
Berning, Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replication
and Extension, 1 J. CoNsUmm REsEAR H 33 (1974). The authors first interviewed
consumers to ascertain their "ideal" brand. They then required consumers to choose
from among a set of unknown brands on the basis of "bits" of information describing each brand. In these experiments, both the number of unknown brands and
the bits of information per unknown brand were varied. The authors defined a
"better" decision as one that selected a brand close to the consumer's ideal brand,
and they reported that increasing the amount of information consumers were provided caused worse-in their words, "dysfunctional"-decisions. Their methodology
and conclusions were quite critically reviewed; the most serious criticism was that
they failed to compare their results to those that would occur by chance. Assume
that a consumer has to choose a brand out of four available brands, and one of the
brands is closer to his ideal than the others. If the consumer knows nothing at all
about the brands, he should make the "best" choice 25% of the time. If the consumer must choose one from eight brands, he will be right 12.5% of the time. But
assume that the consumer is provided with information in the eight-brand case and
makes the right choice 20% rather than 12.5% of the time. It then cannot be said
that more information is worse because in the four-brand case the ignorant consumer
was right 25%of the time and in the eight-brand case the informed consumer was
right only 20% of the time. What you must say is that the information helped in
the eight-brand case because the consumer did 7.5% better than he would have
done if he bad no information at all. The authors, however, in effect said that
more information is worse because in the eight-brand case the consumer was right
only 20% of the time. In fact, it turns out that when the authors' data are corrected
to take into account the effects of chance, more information improved the quality
of decisions in about every case. For a representative sample of various criticisms
of the study, see Russo, More Information Is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby,
Speller and Kohn, J. CONSUMER RESEARCH, December 1974, at 68; Staelin & Payne,
Studies of the Information-Seeking Behavior of Consumers, in CoCNMON AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 185 (1976); Summers, Less Information Is Better?, 11 J. MARETmm
RESEARCH 467 (1974); Wilkie, Analysis of Effects of Information Load, 11 J.
MARKETING REsEARcH 462 (1974).
In addition, in a recent experiment consumers were given different levels of

information about the quality of two consumer products-blankets and slow cookerswith the object of ascertaining whether more information influenced consumers to

choose higher quality brands. This actually occurred in every case. See Sproles,
Geistfeld & Badenhop, Informational Inputs as Influences on E&ent Consumer
Declson-Maktng, 12 J. Cormm= Arr. 88 (1978).

1979]

INTERVENING IN MARKETS

on each list-for example, Los Angeles consumers may care little
about Anaheim prices-and to police firms to ensure that transaction prices are not significantly higher than the prices firms provide to the listing agency. Nevertheless, because providing consumers with inexpensive comparative price data would be so useful
in moving markets toward competitive equilibria, it is a reform that
decisionmakers should seriously consider. 10 1
For the reasons given above, the state should also consider
requiring firms to standardize methods of quoting prices and widelyused terms. In fact, standardization is one of the solutions that
modem disclosure law sometimes adopts. 10 2 If prices and terms are
required to be disclosed in standard form, however, the total amount
of information that firms put out could be reduced. The required
standard form is likely to be concise, yet regulators may frown on
the provision of additional information on the ground that it reduces the effect of or confuses the required disclosure. Further, a
standardization requirement is likely to engender much litigation,
particularly in the period shortly after it is imposed. It seems always to take some time-a long time in the case of the Truth in
Lending Act-until courts and enforcement agencies are in even
rough agreement as to the standardization requirements. 0 3 These
difficulties are set out not to discredit the standardization method
but to emphasize again the advisability of limiting intervention to
noncompetitive markets.
101 If the government decided to make price information available, it should
allow firms freely to cut the prices they quote to the agency collecting and publishing price data. Experimental studies show that equilibrium prices are higher,
other things equal, when firms are required to maintain posted prices for specified
periods. See J. Hong & C. Plott, Implications of Rate Filing for Domestic Dry
Bulk Transportationon Inland Waters: An Experimental Approach, California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper #164 (1976) (copy on file at
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
102The methods and difficulties of modem disclosure law are thoughtfully explored in P. KEETON & M. SIHAPO, PRODUCTS AND TiHn CONSUMER: DECEPTIVE PaACTICEs (1972), and Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending
(U.C.L.A. L. Bnv., forthcoming, 1979). The most important federal statutes requiring standardization as a means of facilitating comparison shopping are the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665a (1976), which requires the price
of money to be quoted in standard fashion, and the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1976), which requires disclosure of the net contents
of each "packaged consumer commodity." The comparison shopping goal of the
former statute, however, has apparently become subordinated to the goal of requiring
firms to disclose information that a hypothetical consumer might consider important
or useful. See Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U. IrL. L.F.
669. For reasons that should by now be plain, this is an inappropriate goal for
disclosure legislation. In addition, the Truth in Lending Act does not require
standardization of the language of term disclosures. See Landers & Rohner, supra.
103 See Landers, Determining the Finance Charge Under the Truth in Lending
Act, 1 Am. B. FOUND. Es. J. 45 (1971).
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3. Institutional Implications
The implication of the foregoing analysis is that courts should
play a more limited role in responding to information problems
than they do at present; the analysis also confirms the wisdom of the
recent trend to place greater reliance on administrative enforcement. The unconscionability doctrine authorizes a court to decline
to enforce a price or contract term if the price or term is both substantively and nonsubstantively unconscionable. 10 4 The latter requirement can currently be satisfied by evidence that a consumer
lacked the information to make utility-maximizing purchase
choices. 105 We have shown, however, that the appropriate issue is
not whether a particular person who subsequently seeks redress was
informed at the time of purchase, but whether the market in which
he acted was behaving competitively. Further, prices and terms
should be considered substantively unfair solely because of the
existence of noncompetitive behavior. Thus courts should inquire into the competitive state of markets when objection is
raised to the enforcement of a contract on information grounds.
An unconscionability doctrine requiring courts to adopt this mode
of analysis, however, would be unsatisfactory for two reasons: (1) it
is very expensive in judicial proceedings to establish whether a
market is actually behaving noncompetitively, and (2) courts cannot
issue the remedies necessary to initiate movement of markets toward
competitive equilibria.
With respect to expense, application of the criteria developed
in parts III and IV of this Article requires a great deal of evidence;
the most important elements of this evidence would pertain to the
degree of price or term dispersion, the extent of comparison shoping, and the identification of relevant markets. Contract cases,
especially those in which consumers are parties, seldom involve
stakes that would outweigh the costs of compiling such evidence.
It may be responded that parties to antitrust suits litigate issues of
similar difficulty, but antitrust damages are generally much higher
than contract damages. The private antitrust plaintiff may recoup
104 See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1055. Nonsubstantive unconscionability
arises when certain factors, such as a lack of commercial sophistication, apparently
prevent a contracting party from exercising his freedom to choose the terms of the
agreement Substantive unconscionability arises when a contract yields a result that
affects a contracting party too harshly or that affects a noncontracting party adversely.
An illustration is warranty disclaimers or assignments of wages.
10 5 The doctrine of strict liability in tort also arose partly as a response to
consumers' supposed inability to appreciate the risks of purchasing consumer goods.
See W. PHossER, Trm LAw OF TORTS 655-56 (1971). See also authorities cited in
note 1 supra.
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treble damages, and the winning party to an antitrust suit is often
awarded costs and attorneys' fees.10 Even so, the majority of private antitrust actions are brought only after cases initiated by the
government have established the existence of noncompetitive behavior in the relevant market. 07 Thus, neither trebling damages
nor awarding attorneys' fees is likely to provide consumers with the
incentive to establish the effect of imperfect information on a market's competitive state. To the extent that this observation is valid,
a court would simply lack the evidence to answer the relevant
normative question. 0 8
Finally, courts would remain poor institutions to resolve information problems even if they could get the evidence that proper
application of the unconscionability doctrine requires, because
courts can provide only "second best" remedies. The judicial power
is limited to striking an offending term or price. Yet we have already shown that the preferred state response to the problem of
imperfect information is not this type of intervention but action to
encourage markets to move toward competitive equilibria. The
most promising means of achieving this market transformation include providing consumers with comparative price and term data
and requiring prices and terms to be quoted in standard fashion.
Courts cannot use these methods.
For all of these reasons, the state should assign responsibility
for dealing with information problems to an administrative agency.
Courts should refrain from taking it upon themselves to deal with
information problems. In practical effect, this would mean that a
claim that the absence of information in some sense vitiated a party's
consent to a certain contract price or term would no longer consti106 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
1 7
0 Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365,
371 (1970). Judgments obtained by the government in antitrust actions establish
prima facie evidence against defendants as to all matters with respect to which the
judgment would operate as an estoppel as between the parties to the prior governmental action. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). Bills have been introduced in Congress
to authorize consumers to bring private suits against firms previously found by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to have committed unfair trade practices or to
have violated FTC cease-and-desist orders. See AM. ENTMIUSE INST. FOR PUB.
PoL'Y R s., CONSUMR CLASs ACTIoNs, Legislative Adalysis No. 85 (July 11, 1977).
Although evaluation of these bills is beyond our scope, we note that passage of
them could obviate some of the difficulties discussed here.
108 Institutional litigators, such as the FTC or the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code's administrator (who is authorized to seek injunctions against "unconscionable
terms or provisions of consumer credit transactions" under the Usn'oart CoNsUMER
Cmmrr CODE §§ 6.103, 6.104 & 6.111(1)(a)), would have the resources to try the
information issue fully. Thus, courts could have complete records in those cases to
which institutional litigators are parties. Nevertheless, for the reasons the text next
gives, a judicial relonse wduld be unsatisfactory even in such cases.
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tute a defense to a suit to enforce a contract. But legal reforms
sufficiently effective to make plausible the ousting of courts may
not be adopted for some time; this realization necessitates an inquiry
into the appropriate role for courts to play in responding to current information problems.
The answer to this query may be derived from the intervention
criteria developed above. 10 9 Of those criteria, the one most susceptible of intelligent judicial use, in the absence of much evidence
respecting market conditions, is the fourth, which holds that the
likelihood of competitive behavior occurring varies inversely with
the ease of making comparisons among the prices and terms offered
by different firms. Thus a court could decide intelligently whether
a challenged price or term was so obscurely quoted as to render
comparisons between it and other prices or terms unreasonably difficult. Also, an inexpensive market sample sometimes could support
at least a rough judgment as to whether such obscurity were common. Judicial action based on application of this fourth criterioni.e., judicial refusal to enforce a price or term on the ground that
the obscure manner in which it was set forth raised the costs of
comparison shopping-would have two major advantages: it would
encourage firms to employ clearer contract clauses, 0 yet it would
not be excessively intrusive because firms could redraft unacceptable
clauses without altering the substance of their transactions (except
insofar as greater consumer awareness would force such alterations).
Therefore, a court apparently would be justified in refusing to enforce obscurely drafted clauses when the evidence presented indicated widespread incidence of obscure drafting.
Courts should be cautious in exercising even this limited power
of intervention, however. The comparison shopping test is only
one of several criteria; a conclusion that a market is behaving noncompetitively cannot rest with assurance solely on the premise that
comparison shopping appears difficult. The fact that markets may
be well-behaved in the face of substantial imperfect information
adds to the force of this caution. Further, it sometimes may be
wrong to rest a conclusion that comparison shopping is unacceptably
difficult on the sole ground that contracts are hard to read. Indeed,
some evidence suggests that consumers can be knowledgeable about
109 See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
110 Section 237 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tent. Draft No. 5,

1970) may be intended to promote the goal of greater contract clarity by the
method of judicial excision of contract clauses. Subsection (3) provides that a
term in a standardized agreement will not be enforced if the party relying on it
had "reason to know" that the other party "believes or assumes that the writing

does not contain" the term.
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market conditions even though they have difficulty reading contracts. For example, consumers apparently knew that finance companies charged higher rates than banks despite the difficulty, before
the Truth in Lending Act, of calculating the annual percentage
rate (APR)."1 Thus, courts should strike contract clauses on the
ground of imperfect information when those clauses are egregiously
obscure and when such obscure drafting is common in the relevant
market.
This analysis also suggests that empowering an administrative
agency to take primary responsibility for responding to information
problems may be a better solution than burdening the courts with
these questions. An administrative agency would have three advantages over courts. First, the agency could be given the resources
to investigate market conditions adequately; second, it could be
given the power to order the remedies that are likely to be effective
in making markets behave more competitively; third, it would be
more effective in policing disclosure schemes. Consistent with this
view, primary enforcement responsibility for the two major disclosure initiatives of recent years, the Truth in Lending Act and
the Magnuson-Moss Act, has been delegated to administrative
2
agencies."
The above proposal is made notwithstanding the dismal record
that administrative agencies have so far made in economic regulation. Indeed, given this record and the great complexity of information issues, an honest and thorough attempt to devise an adequate
administrative scheme could well end with the conclusion that such
a scheme is impossible. Given the current level of understanding
"I A survey conducted by Day and Brandt in 1967 reported that 79.7% of
consumers sampled in states other than California and 80.1% of consumers sampled
in California knew that banks and credit unions charged lower rates than loan or
finance companies. Day & Brandt, supra note 63, at 23. Similarly, Professor
Whitford surveyed new car buyers about the various liabilities manufacturers incurred under the standard automobile warranty and then asked these buyers to read
the warranties. Although the car dealers had drawn the purchasers' attention to the
written warranty disclaimers in less than 10 percent of the cases, and although a
majority of the sample buyers did not have an accurate conception of the meaning
of the disclaimer, a significant number of buyers did understand their rights against
the dealers and manufacturers. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 83, 146-51. These
results may obtain because consumers receive information from sources additional
to their contracts. It may therefore be something of a non sequitur to infer consumer ignorance from the complexity of contractual language alone.
112 Professor Posner correctly points out that an administrative response would
be inadequate unless it provided incentives to consumers to raise complaints and
disincentives to firms to pressure the agency to proceed against effective competitors,
but he says that these objectives to some extent are achievable. See I. Postm,
EcoNomrc AxALYSiS OF LAw 272-73 (2d ed. 1977).
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of information problems, however, the administrative solution
seems sufficiently promising to be tried.
CONCLUSION

The existence of imperfect information is commonly thought
to justify market intervention by courts and legislatures because of
the predominant belief that an imperfectly informed buyer cannot
make utility-maximizing purchase choices. This focus on the conditions under which particular individuals can make optimal decisions is unwise. Not only does it fail to give guidance to decisionmakers respecting when and how they should intervene in markets,
but it is a misplaced concern: when markets are competitive, individuals are protected from the adverse consequences of making
decisions in the face of imperfect information. Therefore, decisionmakers should attempt to ascertain whether noncompetitive behavior is occurring in the relevant market before intervening. Such
a determination would be complex, expensive, and somewhat inexact, but criteria exist that should enable it to be made with an
acceptable (although not fully satisfactory) degree of accuracy. Further, once it has been decided that a market is behaving noncompetitively, the preferable state response is not to regulate prices
or to prohibit the use of specific contract terms; the better response
is to attempt to increase competition in the market. Finally, courts
can do little to increase competition; thus state responses to the
existence of imperfect information should be primarily legislative
and administrative.

